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This thesis argues that when West African states united to form the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), they did so for
reasons very different from those that are advanced by most scholars and West African
policy makers. The conventional wisdom holds that the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia
was motivated by the desire of West African leaders to relieve the humanitarian disaster
caused by the Liberian civil war. In contrast, I will argue that humanitarian considerations
were far less important to the participating states than their desire to protect the political
stability of their own regimes, which they believed would be threatened by a rebel victory
over President Samuel Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). In particular, they worried
that a rebel victory in Liberia would constitute a dangerous precedent for other dissidents
within the sub-region. Moreover, they were concerned that a Charles Taylor-controlled
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This thesis argues that when West African states united to form the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), they did so for
reasons very different from those that are advanced by most scholars and West African
policy makers. The conventional wisdom holds that the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia
was motivated by the desire of West African leaders to relieve the humanitarian disaster
caused by the Liberian civil war. In contrast, I will argue that humanitarian considerations
were far less important to the participating states than their desire to protect the political
stability of their own regimes, which they believed would be threatened by a rebel victory
over President Samuel Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). In particular, they worried
that a rebel victory in Liberia would constitute a dangerous precedent for other dissidents
within the sub-region. Moreover, they were concerned that a Charles Taylor-controlled
Liberia could become a "breeding ground" for similar insurgencies by dissidents fleeing
their regimes.
The process by which ECOMOG evolved helps clarify some of the broader
questions concerning why and how sovereign states overcome their conflicting national
interests and form coalitions. This thesis also has an important practical value: it
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A. THE PUZZLE OF ECOMOG
With the decline of the Cold War and the attendant changes in the global security
environment, sub-Saharan Africa is becoming increasingly marginalized in the context of
international security. In particular, U.S. policy makers often fail to see any vital strategic
interests in sub-Saharan Africa to merit a direct U.S. intervention in its regional conflicts.
Africans must solve their own problems. In this regard, the joint intervention of West
African nations into the Liberian civil war offers an important case study of regional
cooperation. What were the motivations for West African nations to join this coalition?
What are its consequences for theories of international cooperation on alliance formation?
What are the practical implications for the future of regional cooperation in general, and
West African security cooperation in particular ?
This thesis argues that when West African states united under the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to form the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) directed at Liberia, they did so for
reasons very different from those that are advanced by most scholars and West African
policy makers. The conventional wisdom holds that the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia
was motivated by the desire of West African leaders to relieve the humanitarian disaster
caused by the Liberian civil war.
In contrast, I will argue that humanitarian considerations were far less important
to the participating states than their desire to protect the political stability of their own
regimes, which they believed would be threatened by a rebel victory over President
Samuel Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). In particular, they worried that a rebel
victory in Liberia would constitute a dangerous precedent and incentive to other
dissidents within the sub-region. Moreover, they were concerned that a Charles Taylor-
controlled Liberia could become a "breeding ground" for similar insurgencies by
dissidents and exiles fleeing their own regimes. The latter concern was compounded by
intelligence indicating the participation of dissidents from other West Africa states
trained in Libya and Burkina Faso, in aid of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL).
Specifically, I contend that an armed rebel victory over Doe's AFL will threaten
the stability and legitimacy of sub-regional governments for the following reasons:
(i) the precedent value of a total NPFL rebel victory over a dreaded dictatorship,
characteristic of other regimes within the sub-region;
(ii) widespread intelligence indicating that the core of Charles Taylor's rebel army
consisted of dissidents from other ECOWAS states and the suspicions that a
consolidated rebel government in Monrovia would in turn provide a staging
ground from which these dissidents will unseat their home regimes;
(iii) the subsequent degeneration of what began as a welcome revolt against Doe into a
full-scale factional, ethnic, or tribal war with a propensity to infest and spread
beyond Liberia's borders; 1
(iv) coupled with (ii), rebel leader Charles Taylor, while being hotly pursued by Doe
prior to his successful insurgency campaign, had been harshly treated by some sub
regional regimes;
(v) the uncontrolled influx of refugees across the Community was resulting in an
unmanageable and uneasy domestic security situation in most member states; and
(vi) the implicit but unequivocal signal from the international community and in
particular, the UN and U.S. that forthwith, irresponsible client states may never
again be bailed out by international intervention.
B. SO WHAT? - SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIBERIAN CASE
The African continent has become synonymous with political conflict since the
1950s and 1960s. Since the 1960s, Africans have witnessed major conflicts in Nigeria
and the Congo, later Zaire and re-baptized in 1997 as the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1 Stephen P. Riley, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?", Conflict
Studies 287, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, February 1996, pp. 6, 9.
By the 1970s, Africa's wars had caught up with Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique,
Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), and the Western Sahara. 2
Given the decline of the Cold War, the dominant opinion among U.S. policy
makers is that the U.S. has no vital economic or security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa
and therefore should not directly intervene in its crises. Consequently, the future of
external intervention in the conflicts that plague the continent is going to depend more on
what Africans can offer themselves and how they can unite to deal with regional
instabilities. As such, the relevance and implications of ECOMOG for the prospects of
humanitarian relief, political stability and regional security, especially in Africa, cannot
be overemphasized.
In particular, it is important to examine the motivations and their implications for
the guidance of future collective interventions. Traditionally, analysts have identified
numerous reasons to doubt that West Africans can unite in the way that they did in
ECOMOG, especially given the scale, costs, complexity and peculiar circumstances of
the dynamics of West African politics in general, and the Liberian crises in particular.
The importance, necessity, and timely initiation of such sub-regional self-help
mechanism is underscored by the recommendations of the Clinton administration, the UN
and the international community to African governments to subscribe to an African
Crises Response Force (ACRE). This is intended to pool African troops into a collective
mechanism for intervention in the conflicts on the continent. This is part of the 1997 U.S.
national security policy, which emphasizes a more direct role for regional and sub-
regional organizations in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. 3
To successfully develop viable regional and sub-regional collective security
mechanisms, it is important to understand the fundamental motivations and strategic
behavior and calculations of regional and sub-regional security actors. As a model for
regional cooperation, ECOMOG offers positive as well as negative lessons. It shows how
sovereign states can synthesize their selfish national interests and unite to deal with
2 Raymond W. Copson, Africa 's Wars and Prospectsfor Peace, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.,
1994, p. xv.
3
"A National Security Strategy for a New Century," The White House, May 1997, p. 28.
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common concerns and mutual interests. Besides ECOWAS members had the opportunity
of learning the lessons of diplomacy, compromise and negotiations over sensitive issues
of national security. Operationally, ECOMOG tested the capacity of West Africa states to
maintain sustained levels of commitment in a comprehensively costly military operation
in the context of the military, economic, political and social circumstances of ECOMOG
states. Among others, ECOMOG's bad lessons include the strong resurgence of
Anglophone Francophone rivalries. I argue these understandings can help regional leaders
themselves to define more effective, and feasible modalities (operationally and otherwise)
for invoking and regulating future interventions. The unclear mandate and motives of
ECOMOG, contributed to the setbacks, lack of confidence, leverage and cooperation that
has characterized every aspect of the relationship between ECOMOG and the rebel
factions.
Further, the alliance of West African states with a legacy of subtle disagreements
in no less a mission than one of such severe economic, political, social, and military or
security stakes, is relevant in grappling with the political phenomenon of how "small"
states can unite around new leadership and organizations in response to crises in the
absence of a leadership such as the U.S. or UN.
From a theoretical perspective, this thesis makes a modest contribution to the
understanding of how, when, and why, alliances and coalitions are formed. Significantly,
it tests the validity of Euro-centric international relations propositions in the context of
the political dynamics of the post-colonial modem African state.
C. HOW? - RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
This research is basically a historical case study which incorporates primary
research based on interviews with West African policy makers.
In doing this historical analysis, I also used reports by newspapers and scholarly
journals on Africa and security issues, textbooks, electronic resources (Internet and Lexis
Nexis, etc.). UN and ECOWAS resolutions, documents, reports and communiques,
including, U.S. newspaper reports, press releases and General Accounting Office
Publications (GPO) on Liberia and multilateral intervention will all be examined and
evaluated.
However, this research will be constrained by the fact that the Liberian conflict
endures and as such ECOMOG is still an ongoing operation. Consequently, substantial
relevant information is likely to be unavailable due to the security implications of
disclosure and publicity, as well as basic reasons of political expediency. For the same
reasons, politicians and participating soldiers of member states are likely to be evasive on
important and critical questions that will be the subject matter of interviews and
questionnaires. Notwithstanding these limitations, I am of the opinion that so much has
been said, written, or done since the advent of ECOMOG. The resulting literature should
avail a diligent research a modest resource base on which one can reasonably attempt to
resolve the issues addressed by this thesis.
Further, the phenomenon of causal motivations which this thesis proposes to
establish, does not lend itself to direct quantification, and measurement. Statistical
manipulations can barely help address the issues posed. In order to elicit any meaningful
evidence of the motives or perceptions that underlie the minds and behaviors individuals
and groups or organizations acting for and behalf of sovereign states in their international
relations a certain amount of conjuncture is necessary. This is more so in the realm of
national and international security concerns which seldom of transparency.
Notwithstanding the constraints of this approach, I believe that critical case
studies of specific events elicit the best evidence regarding the motives or causes of
particular alliances. Consequently I relied extensively on statements by West African
leaders from which inferences of motivations may be legitimate reached.
Further to buttress my conclusions against the traditional accusation of being
anecdotal, I dug deeper to incorporate some primary research findings through an
interview with Sir Dawda Jawara, ex-president of The Gambia and Chairman of
ECOWAS, and the SMC at the time ECOMOG was launched. This exchange afforded
me the exclusive opportunity hearing the view of one of the most accomplished statesmen
of the African continent and principal architects ofECOWAS and ECOMOG. In addition
are also interviewed other sub-regional policy actors of lesser profile as well as some
participants in ECOMOG. Some of the insights from these interactions although not
specifically identified influenced some of the conclusions reached in this thesis.
Chapter II sets the theoretical foundations of this thesis, arguing basically that
balance of power theoretical propositions of balancing and bandwagoning offer a
plausible explanation of motivation for ECOMOG. Chapters III and IV offer historical
and analytic accounts of the Liberian conflict and the legacy and roots of non-cooperation
within ECOWAS respectively. Chapter V evaluates the humanitarian concerns vis-a-vis a
the realpolitik preoccupation of West African leaders. Chapter VI examines the motive
and sources of instability and illegitimacy of some of the key actors while chapter VII
analyses the rational of resorting to ECOMOG as a "boat to the rescue." Chapter VIII
concludes this thesis by reflecting some of the effects, implications and lessons of
ECOMOG for policy making.
II. THEORETICAL/ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:
WHEN AND WHY DO SOVEREIGN STATES FORM
ALLIANCES OR COALITIONS?
The existing literature on how, when, and why sovereign nation states come
together to form alliances or coalitions offers a valuable starting point for my case study
of ECOMOG. Some international relations theorists argue that the alliance or coalition
behavior of sovereign states is driven or characterized by balancing against perceived
threats to their national interests or bandwagoning with the threat.
This chapter examines the conceptual and theoretical dynamics of the threat
hypothesis vis-a-vis alternative theoretical explanations of factors that motivate sovereign
national entities to reach collective decisions to form alliances or coalitions. I argue that
while taking into account the context, peculiarities and constraints of West African states,
Euro-centric international relations theoretical propositions are very much applicable to
the understanding of the strategic thinking of African states. Further, I briefly discuss the
concepts of alliances or coalitions an the application of these theoretical propositions to
explaining the motivations ofECOMOG.
Ultimately, this chapter forms the theoretical and conceptual foundation on which
I will subsequently base evidence to show that sub-regional governments, such as
Nigeria, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana, etc., mutually perceived the
prospect of a rebel military victory in Liberia as a major threat to their national security
and regime legitimacy. Others, such as the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, were lending
covert and overt support to the insurgents and as such had no cause for apprehension.
Consequently, the former group of states, against all odds, desperately mustered the
political will and over-stretched their national capacities to accomplish an alliance against
the threat. On the other hand, the latter group had no motivation to be part of such an
effort, and indeed, subverted and undermined ECOMOG in subtle and direct ways, which
amounted to allying with the rebel threat. In conclusion, I shall be suggesting that
ECOMOG was a manifestation of Lord Brougham's thesis that " ...whenever a sudden
and great change takes place in the internal structure of a state, dangerous in a high
degree to all neighbors, they have a right to attempt, by hostile interference, the
restoration of an order of things safe to themselves; or at least, to counter balance, by
active aggression, the new force suddenly acquired. ..."
4
Other theoretical explanations that have been advanced by international relations
theorists, and political scientists to explain the causes or motivations of alliances in the
international system includes the following:
(i) alliances are formed in response to mutual or common threats (states may
"balance or "bandwagon");
(ii) alliances are motivated by ideological or cultural affinities (also described as
"birds of the same feather flocking together and flying apart");
(iii) alliances are motivated by foreign aid;
(iv) alliances are caused by trans-national penetration;
(v) alliances are motivated by humanitarian concerns. 5
However, I consider these hypotheses of lessor explanatory force in relation to
ECOMOG and will therefore accord them no detailed discussion in this thesis.
A. BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING
The proponents of this hypothesis have explained that "alliances form and attract
members fundamentally as response to perceived threats to national security."6 Waltz
argued that "...In the quest for security, alliances may have to be formed."7 He cites the
example of post- 1890 Russia being faced with a German threat even if she defeated
4 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe 's Classical Balance ofPower: A Case History ofthe Theory and
Practice ofOne ofthe Great Concepts ofEuropean Statecraft, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1955, p. 63. This is part of an extract the author quoted in extenso from Lord Brougham's Works,
Vol. Ill, London: July, 1809, pp. 161-205.
5
Walt, The Origins ofAlliances, pp. 17-49. The author develops hypotheses i-iv. Hypothesis v,
which is essentially the anti-thesis to my argument, is the explanation of those West African
leaders who back ECOMOG. Perhaps copying American style justifications for the interventions
in Somalia, Bosnia, and to some extend the historic Operation Desert Storm.
6 Michael Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs,
vol. 19 Book 1, Denver: Colorado Graduate School of International Affairs, University of
Denver, p. 15.
Austria-Hungary to gain control of the straits linking the Mediterranean and the Black
Seas. France, on the other hand, could regain possession of Alsace-Lorraine only by
defeating Germany. The author concludes that "the perception of a common threat
(Germany) brought Russia and France together."8
It is important to note that, all these arguments are couched in balance of power
vocabulary. However, they all have as a common thread, in the fact that it is a mutual
threat that drives states to form alliance or coalitions. This is because even in classical
balance of power theory, to cause the formation of alliances or coalitions, the perceived
imbalances should pose a threat to the national security to compel independent states to
be inclined to ally to balance or preserve the status quo. Therefore states do not form
alliance or coalitions unless imbalances threaten them. The crux of these expositions
which make them relevant, if not invaluable, to understanding the conduct of ECOWAS
lies in the principle that confronted with a common threat to their national security, nation
states would rise above less important differences to ally against the threat.
In classical international relations theory, even though threats tended to refer to
the threat of one state to another or others, it did not exclude threats emanating from
internal conflict of a neighboring state. The issue, therefore, seems to be more of how
states perceive a threat irrespective of whether the source of the threat is the aggressive
behavior of another state or a product of internal civil war within the sovereign
jurisdiction of its neighbor. In my view, this issue is aptly put by Edward Gulick when he
wrote that, "whenever a sudden and great change takes place in the internal structure of a
State, dangerous in high degree to all its neighbors, they have the right to attempt, by
hostile interference, the restoration of an order of things safe to themselves; or, at least, to
counter-balance, by active aggression, the new force, suddenly acquired."9
This underscores the fact that the critical test of this hypothesis is whether there is
a development which constitutes a threat to national security, and whether the perception




Gulick, Europe 's Classical Balance ofPower, p. 63. This struck me as a more elegant
rendition of the central argument of this thesis.
is shared by other states. Beyond this, it appears to be of very little import whether the
threat emanates from an aggressive external behavior of another state, or is a product of
an intra-state upheaval. The fundamental importance of a mutual or common threat as the
key to stimulating sovereign states to aggregate their military capabilities is underscored
by the following circuitous but insightful statement by Sir Robert Walpole before the
British House of Commons:
The use of alliances, Sir, has in the past years been too much
experience to be contested. It is by leagues, well concerted and strictly
observed, that the weak are divided against the strong, the bounds are set
to the turbulence of ambition, that the torrent of power is restrained, and
empires preserved from those inundations of war that, in former times laid
the world in ruins. By alliances, Sir, the equipoise of power is maintained,
and those alarms and apprehensions avoided, which must arise from
vicissitudes of empire and the fluctuations of perpetual contest. 10
Historical examples of alliances as balance of power devices in eighteenth century
Europe included the alliances of the Seven Years' War, where Britain and Prussia joined
against France and Austria; or the broader system of French alliance, which included
Spain, the Ottoman Empire, Sweden and other smaller German states. Again, it is
significant to note that even though these propositions are referable to the strategic
responses of European states to threat, they represent important principles for
rationalizing and understanding motivations of the principal actors in ECOMOG.
George Liska advances what are substantively threat hypothesis arguments as
follows:
In theory, the relationship between alliances to the balance of power is
simple enough. Put affirmatively, states enter into alliances to supplement
each other's capability. Put negatively, an alliance is a means of reducing
the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens
one's independence. 11
10 Quoted in Gulick, Europe 's Classical Balance ofPower, p. 61 . The author cites Hansard
Parliamentary History, vol. XII, pp. 168-169.
;/ George Liska, Nations in Alliances: The Limits ofInterdependence, Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1968, p26.
10
Once again, the criteria seem to depend on whether or not the power or threat is
antagonistic, irrespective of whether it is a product of intra-state or extra-state conflict.
This notion combines threat and balance of power arguments, and legitimately so, since
they are in any case related. Clearly, the author was writing in 1968, a period when the
international system was sharply characterized by the Cold War. Consequently, most
alliances reflected the bipolar balance of power. Besides, the threat perception in that
period was without doubt viewed from the East - West prism.
Similarly, Walt discusses the threat hypothesis in terms that reflect the implicit
relationship between threat and power balancing. He posits that "When confronted with a
significant threat, states may either balance or bandwagon." 12 According to him,
balancing means "allying with others against the prevailing threat," while bandwagoning
entails an "alignment with the source of the danger."
In the related field of what is being categorized as international cooperation
theory, virtually the same principles have been employed to explain the influences on
inter-state cooperation. Emphasizing that the perception of a common threat was an
important condition for the viability of the concert of Europe at its peak from 1815 to
1823, it has been argued that " As the perception of common threat falls, the
incentives to cooperate fall as well. Thus, the identification of and common agreement on
an external threat are factors that create common interests and encourage cooperation."13
In my opinion, this proposition is very much in accord with the traditional international
relations theorists whom I have quoted. Besides, the present author in her footnotes
credits first principles to some of the same theorists. Consequently, to avoid restating the
obvious, I shall briefly discuss some of the concepts of alliances and or coalitions before
proceeding to evaluate the application of these propositions to the Liberian civil war and
the responses of West African states.
12 Walt, The Origins ofAlliances, p. 17.
13
Lisa L. Martin, "Foundations for International Cooperation," in Peter H. Smith, ed., Drug
Policy in the Americas, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p. 254.
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B. ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS
The popularity and usage of the concept of alliances appears in European
antiquity. In recent research, alliances have been defined as "bi/multilateral arrangements
among nation-states involving national security-oriented coupling of formalized,
(proclaimed or secret) strategic intentions and projected responses. For many, alliances
are merely formalized international cooperation focusing on national security matters,
generally in the form of intended responses to actual or perceived threats." 14 From this
self-explanatory definition we can infer as common characteristics of an alliance, some or
all of the following features:
(i) a collaborative relationship involving two or more states;
(ii) actual or potential aggregation of military forces and or resources;
(iii) mutuality of national security interests;
(iv) perceived or actual common threat; and/or
(v) preference for collective over unilateral response to the perceived or actual threat.
In theory as well as in practice alliances or coalitions may encompass economic,
social, and political dimensions of national security. This may be particularly relevant for
ECOWAS which essentially evolving from an economic alliance to a military or strategic
coalition. However, for the purposes of the present thesis alliances shall be used in
reference to ECOMOG, the strategic or military aspect of West African cooperation.
C. APPLICATION OF THEORY TO THE NPFL, ECOMOG AND WEST
AFRICAN LEADERS
I contend that humanitarian concerns were far less important to the ECOMOG
participating states than their strategic concerns for the legitimacy and political stability
of their own regimes. In particular, I argue that the most logical and plausible theoretical
explanation of the motivation of the principal actors in ECOMOG is the hypothesis that,
14 Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, p. 5.
12
when confronted with a significant mutual threat, states may either ally with others
against the threat, or ally with the source of the danger. 15
Significantly, West African states did not feel threatened only in security, but also
the legitimacy of their regimes. Arguably, national security in the context of most, if not
all African states tends to boil down to the security and perpetuation of an incumbent
regime. To put it with all possible political incorrectness, without exception, all the
principal actors in ECOMOG were in very many ways not different from the infamous
dictatorship of president Samuel Kanyon Doe which was under siege. "...If we watch
Doe fall in such a disastrous fashion, what is the guarantee that this insurgency will not
inspire some of our own countrymen to rise against us?" some may have asked
themselves.
The nature of this threat was in terms of the implications of the challenge for
dictatorships, the bases and legitimacy of whose claim to power was in many as spurious
as the Doe regime. This contention is based on my assumption that in the context of small
and weak states, especially in Africa, where military coups and armed insurgencies are a
familiar occurrence, the national security of the state does not mean much more than the
security and perpetuation of the regime or government of the day.
Indeed, in most African countries national security is derogated to the simple
preservation and perpetuation of the personal rule of individuals barely capable of
exercising authority over the entire political and economic spectrum of the state. As a
result, William Zartman argues, neighboring that states encroach on the collapsing state's
sovereignty by involving themselves in its politics directly and by hosting dissident
movements who play politics from neighboring sanctuaries. 16 Given the "degenerate" but
realpolitik notion of national security, any threat or challenge (actual or imagined) to
these personal rulers and their cabals of partisan, ethnic, or tribal beneficiaries triggers a
security and legitimacy desperation sufficient to provoke the full scale coercive powers of
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics, New York: Random House , 1979, p. 166.
16 William I. Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, " in William Zartman
ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration ofLegitimate Authority, Boulder, CO:
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995, p.9.
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the state. Without doubt, the fierce and quickly succeeding armed challenge to the
Liberian demagogue, inevitably signaled an eminent danger to ECOWAS leaders, whom
Charles Taylor had occasion to describe as a "club of dictators".
In these circumstances, I argue that what began as a rebel insurrection against
Doe's unrelenting dictatorship was perceived, and rightly so, by ECOWAS leaders as a
matter of far wider strategic implications than a simple Liberian headache. For the
numerous security-conscious and legitimacy-craving dictatorships within the sub-region,
the insurgency represented a festering cancer which they could not afford to leave
unmanaged. Specifically, I argue that the principal backers ofECOMOG such as Nigeria,
Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone perceived an armed NPFL ascendancy to
power in Liberia as a threat to the survival of their own regimes. Consequently they
united to balance "the development of such a hostile force." Importantly the pro-
ECOMOG regimes sought by their intervention to preempt the entrenchment of what
they perceived as a hostile force, and to influence the trends in Liberia to ensure that the
outcome is a regime favorably disposed to themselves. I will contend that this objective
of intervention is reflected by the ironical acknowledgment of Charles Taylor rebel
leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), after years of bitter fighting
against ECOMOG, that ECOMOG' s intervention was motivated by a genuine fraternal
desire to see peace restored to Liberia and his apology for his initial hostility to the
force.
17
On the other hand, Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso bandwagoned by allying with
the NPFL, the source of the threat by providing military, logistics, communications and
other support to the rebels. Their pro- NPFL stances were further demonstrated by open
condemnation and opposition to ECOMOG shown by Captain Blaise Campaore, the
Burkinabe leader. The Ivorian leader, President Houphouet Boigny on the other hand
resorted to the more subtle but effective use of the covert assistance and application of
leverage to reinforce the Francophone opposition to ECOMOG and undermine
international legitimacy and support.
17
"Breaking the Ice," West Africa, June 12-18, 1995, p. 920.
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Given the security implications of the conflict, when it became obvious that
neither the UN nor the U.S. was disposed to a direct intervention in what had become a
full scale brutal factional war, West African leaders were left with no option than to resort
to self help.
18
In theory, "the distribution of the perception of a external threat within the
alliance is important in that if some members of the alliance perceive greater amounts of
threats than others, the cohesion of the group will erode." 19 Simply put, this implies that
states which are more prone to the threat will be at a greater national security risk and
consequently will be more likely to demonstrate commitment to an alliance against such a
threat.
It will be my contention that the major obstacle to a threat consensus in Africa in
general, and West Africa in particular is the Francophone-Anglophone colonial legacy.
This because while Francophone Africa states are structurally dependent of French
paternalism for their stability, regime legitimacy and national security, their Anglophone
neighbors have to depend on themselves or an increasingly insensitive international
community. I shall demonstrate later that alliance cohesion is a direct function of the
threat perception of the various sub-regional regimes or governments. I also explain how
the relative changes in the status of the some Community states vis-a-vis the potential or
actual threat of Charles Taylor and his NPFL, affected the threat perception of these
regimes and consequently their role in ECOMOG. However, to put the theoretical
plausibility of the threat hypothesis in perspective, I shall now proceed to examine the
alternative explanation advanced by West African leaders, which I have already described
as the humanitarian concerns hypothesis.
18 Reed Kramer, "Liberia: Casualty of the Cold War's End?, " Centerfor Strategic and
International Studies, Africa Notes, No. 174, July 1995, p. 7. The author quotes State Department
officials as indicating that the prevailing view in the U.S. Foreign Policy establishment was for
the U.S. to stay out and the conflict left to Liberians to work out themselves.
19 A. Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics" in W.T.R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of
International Relations, Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, pp. 83-106.
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D. HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: A "NEW" HYPOTHESIS, A MASK
OR REALITY?
The concept of humanitarian intervention has a dated history. Incidents of
intervention under this generic description, however, appear to have gained even greater
currency following the end of the Cold War and the high wave of international awareness
due to an increasingly diversified media activity—the "CNN factor." This increasing
awareness and sensitivity about the victims of civil wars, interstate conflict, authoritarian
regimes, droughts, famines and human rights abuses have accounted for the
preponderance of incidents of humanitarian interventions.
It has been argued that an imposition of a refugee burden on neighboring states
grounds a right both in customary international law and under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter of intervention and/or enforcement action not subject to the limits of purely
humanitarian intervention. 20 The threat to peace and security is grounds for invoking
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which overrides the claim to sovereignty and domestic
jurisdiction. Luise Druke argues that in respect of internal or domestic conflict that cause
massive flows of refugees, "there is an emerging consensus on the legitimacy of taking
action in the country of origin so that people would not have to flee."21
Yewdall Jennings has argued that traditional doctrines do not provide a legal basis
for action against a state that generates refugees. However, he acknowledges that general
and customary international law is relevant to the consideration of the legality or
otherwise of the conduct of a state which creates a refugee crisis. 22 On the other hand,
Dowty and Loescher argue that recent trends in international opinion tends to favor a
broader definition of state responsibility, which includes the prevention of harm to others.
The UN commissioned "New Flows" group declared that "averting massive flows of
refugees is a matter of serious concern to the international community as a whole and that
20 Dowty and Loescher, "Refugee Flows As Grounds for International Action," International
Security, Summer, 1996, Vol 21, no., 1, p. 45.
21 Luise Druke, Preventive Actionfor Refugee Producing Situations, Frankfurt; Peter Lang, 1990,
p.209.
2 Yewdall Jennings, "Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question, " British
Yearbook ofInternational Law, vol. 20939, p. 1 10. Also see Dowry and Loescher, p.53.
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such flows carry adverse consequences for the economies of the countries of origin and
entire region, thus endangering international peace and security."23
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar contend that "As global concern for
humanitarian issues increases, 'the balance between sovereignty and suffering is shifting
in favor of greater international sensitivity to the claims of those who suffer' and greater
impatience with the obstructionism of uncaring governments."24 However, the most
decisive statement in the debate of the balance between sovereignty and the limits of
intervention may be attributed to the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali. In rather precise, concise, and direct language he wrote in his Agenda for Peace
that "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; it is theory and was
never matched by reality."25 Thomas Weiss and Larry Minear wrote that "The world is
poised between the Cold War and an embryonic new humanitarian order in which life
threatening suffering and human rights abuses become legitimate international concerns
irrespective of where they take place."26
1. Concern for Refugees
As the military stalemate continued, non-combatants, women, children, and
nationals of other West African states became the indiscriminate and defenseless targets
of all the factions in the Liberian civil war. By May 1990, West Africa and the
international community as a whole were overwhelmed by the news of the cold-blooded
massacre of civilians who had sought refuge in the Lutheran Church and diplomatic
premises across Monrovia. In addition, hundreds of thousands of refugees flooded
neighboring countries.
23 UN Doc. A/41/324, May 13, 1986, paragraph 63.
24
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and
Strategiesfor Political Reconstruction, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 2.
25 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, An Agenda
for Peace, New York: United Nations, 1992, p. 9.
26 Thomas L. Weiss and Larry Minear, "Preface," in Thomas L. Weiss and Larry Minear eds.,
Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War, Boulder, CO: Lynn
Reinner, 1993, p. vii.
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The social and cultural impact of refugee movements often threaten inter-
communal harmony and undermine major societal values by altering the ethnic, cultural,
religious and linguistic composition of host populations. 27 These consequences are even
more dire in the context of the ethnic diversities of West African states and populations.
In countries with racial, ethnic, religious, or other divisions, a refugee influx can place a
potentially disrupting strain on the system. In addition, mass influxes of the kind
witnessed across West Africa can endanger the social and economic stability, particularly
in countries where ethnic rivalries may be virulent, where the central government is weak,
and where the consensus on the legitimacy of the political system is lacking and where
essential resources are limited.
28
I argue that the arbitrary boundaries of West African states and the resulting
structure of ethnic, cultural or tribal distribution make refugee influxes more of a classical
security issue than a humanitarian issue. Consequently, security concerns of the host
country begin with the question of whether it can physically control the refugee
population, which frequently includes armed combatants, dissidents, exiles, etc. For
example, Hutu refugees in Zaire included many perpetuators of the "machete genocide"
in Rwanda. Similarly, Liberian refugees fleeing into neighboring countries included
members of Doe's embattled AFL, most of whom had previously engaged in politically
motivated massacres and other gross violations of human rights of Doe's political
opponents. The subsequent remobilization of some of these exiles into rebel factions from
neighboring Sierra Leon and Guinea speak to the fact of how much of a source of
instability refugees can possibly be. In addition to these, there were also present in
neighboring countries Liberian exiles and opposition elements who had earlier escaped
Doe's tyranny. The very confrontation of these exiles with their previous persecutors may
itself be a ready recipe for an extension of the civil war into a refugee camp or the host
state.
Hence, I contend that a distinction may be made between what has been
characterized as soft humanitarian intervention by "do gooders" and a more strategic type
27 Dowty and Loescher, " Refugee Flows and Grounds for International Action," pp. 43- 46.
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of intervention by state actors who may be motivated by specific strategic concerns
arising out of developments which also constitute a humanitarian crises. In the latter
scenarios humanitarian concerns are at best secondary considerations, with issues of
regime survival taking precedence. I argue that by May 1990, some ECOWAS
governments could no longer afford to ignore the slaughterhouse into which Liberia had
degenerated at the hands of savage and barbaric warring factions. However this was due
more to self interest than to any pretenses of fraternity and charity.
28
Ibid., pp. 4, 8.
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III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: 1822-1989
Liberia is the oldest republic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to its degeneration into
civil war, Liberia was by all standards the United States' strongest ally in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Consequently, it was the largest recipient of U.S. economic aid and military
assistance in the region. In this Chapter I will attempt to situate the Liberian civil in its
historical context in order to clarify some of the social, political and economic dynamics
of the conflict. In so doing, I argue that the insurgency and ultimately the factional
fighting that engulfed Liberia was a product of the structural divisions, discriminations,
exclusions and animosities that characterized the very foundations of the Liberian society.
In particular, I contend that in the absence of any fundamental and radical reform,
coupled with the absence of a paternalistic U.S. military protection, conflict was
inevitable. Significantly, most other West African states share in such flawed statecraft
and as such are characterized by similar political dynamics. An in-depth understanding of
the background and political structural sources of the Liberian crises will facilitate an
appreciation of the reasons why sub-regional states with similar backgrounds perceived
the Liberia crises as a remote challenge to their own stability and the legitimacy of their
regimes.
A. THE BLACK REPUBLIC: THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION
SOCIETY (ACS) OR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT?
The extensive and long-standing relationship since 1816 between Liberia and the
U.S. is very much a product of Liberia's history. This is because the first settlers to reach
Liberia's shores were freed American slaves, and "free persons of color" under the
sponsorship of the ACS, on board a U.S. Navy ship. This resettlement project was
supported with funds from the U.S. Treasury. 29 This "black colony was administered by
white agents until 1841, when the last administrator, Thomas Buchanan, brother of the
29 Kramer, "Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End ?" p. 2.
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U.S. President, died in office."30 Non-white occupants of the office included Joseph
Jenkin Roberts, who succeeded Governor Buchanan in 1841. Indeed, from the inception
of the settlement until about 1828, the colonial agent commanded considerable access to
funds set aside by the U.S. Congress under the Slave Trade Act of 1819. 3]
Liberia, from all indications, was a mere territorial extension of the United States.
This is the historical background which produced a Liberian constitution, political,
judicial, and administrative systems; even its flag, towns, counties, etc., were virtually
American place names or mere versions of American forms. 32 However, in the 1 840s,
Liberia faced external threats from aggressive French African territorial aggrandizement
and Great Britain, which declined to recognize Liberia's sovereignty. The Board of
Governors of the ACS resolved in 1 846 that the time had arrived when it was expedient
for the people of the commonwealth of Liberia to take into their own hands the whole
work of self-government, including the management of foreign relations. 33 Left without
options, the colonists accepted independence. Significantly, formal independence was
"imposed" on the colonists. Some have argued that up to the dawn of the civil conflict
Liberia was never an independent country. However, it is also a historical fact that the
U.S. Congress declined persuasions to formally adopt Liberia as a colony.
Some schools of thought argue that the U.S. was compelled by the demands of
sovereignty to enable the settlers to break formal ties with the ACS. Great Britain
regarded the ACS as an association of private persons who were not competent in
international law to demand and exact taxes from British traders. Independence and
sovereignty were therefore necessary to change Liberia's status in international law from
that of a private venture to an independent state. 34 But the question remains to be
answered of whether, given the processes and pedigree persons that established and
30
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31
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32 Harold D. Nelson, ed., Liberia: A Country Study, Washington: The American University






administered the settlement, Liberia did not bear the unmistakable mark of an indirect act
of the U.S. government.
The debate as to whether or not Liberia was at the very least a de facto colony of
the U.S. is not a mere transcends academic discussion into the realm of policy. It has been
raised during past and present policy debates as to what levels of involvement the U.S.
should maintain in resolving the Liberian civil war. The contention that Liberia was a
defacto U.S. colony was in issue during recent Hearings before the U.S. Senate sub-
committee on African Affairs. While Senator Donald M. Payne, New Jersey argued that
the crises in Liberia was the responsibility of the U.S. because Liberia was to all intents
and purposes a U.S. colony, Senator Victor O. Fraser, Virgin Islands (Ind.) vehemently
protested any such inference.35
Whatever the merits of this argument the reality that cannot be ignored is that the
historical relationship engineered and produced a geographically distant community
(Liberia) with a profound structural dependency on the U.S. This structure evolved
governments which tended to depend on the United States for their legitimacy.
Consequently, Liberia's leaders before and including Doe adopted policies and practices
that excluded, discriminated, and victimized larger sections of the society. As a result
Liberia has always been a nation divided against itself with populations which were never
integrated into a national identity or given reasonable access to economic and political
opportunities.
B. THE AMERICO-LIBERIAN HEGEMONY: THE ROOTS OF
CONFLICT
However, the enthusiasm with which the "True Whig" hegemony, the Americo-
Liberian political elite, who ruled for 150 years, stepped into the seat of government bore
no evidence of any reluctance to inherit the privileges of political domination from the
white administrators of the U.S. government and the ACS. Prior to this, "early
distinctions were made by the settlers between themselves, and the 'natives', as they
23
called the indigenous people."36 Within the ranks of the Americo-Liberians, a small
number of mulattos, usually light skinned Americo-Liberians, mainly from Virginia and
Maryland, formed an elite group distinguished by their "means" to education. The
mulattos, became the prominent social and economic class and collaborated with U.S.-
based business interests to effectively dominate the Liberian economy and commerce. 37
This socio-economic domination engineered a political equation that entrenched their
domination of the political leadership of Liberia from 1841-1981.
The Americo-Liberian hegemony tended to be domineering, insensitive and
disregarding of whatever may have been the stake of the indigenous population in this so-
called Black Republic. Significantly, this discrimination and exclusion was institutional
and systemic. The Liberian Declaration of Independence affirmed as follows: "We the
people of Liberia were originally inhabitants of the United States of North America."38
Manifestly, not even the most generous construction of this phraseology could bring
native Liberians within the contemplation of this declaration.
This paradox of a land of freedom for blacks and persons of color, who were
suffering persecution, rejection, and exclusion from America's melting pot, was even
further confounded by similar constitutional exclusions of the natives. Native or
indigenous Liberians were already officially designated as aborigines and the 1847
Constitution alluded to them as such. 39 Article 5, section 12 of the Constitution, for
instance, stated that "no person shall be entitled to hold real estate in the republic unless
he be a citizen of the same." Section 1 3 of the same Article originally provided that, "the
great object for forming these colonies being to provide a home for the disposed and
oppressed children of Africa, and to regenerate and enlighten the benighted continent,
none but Negroes or persons of color shall be admitted to citizenship of this republic."40
35 House Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on Africa, 104,h Congress,
Second Session, May 8, 1996, p. 15.











Consequently, indigenous Liberians were constitutionally excluded from citizenship of
the republic, and deriving from that was an exclusion from owning landed property.
Meanwhile, the indigenous Liberians were tasked freely of their labor for road
construction, as well as compelled to pay taxes to an alien government of a republic of
which they were not citizens. This fraudulent beginning persisted until the threat of
European incursions into Liberia's hinterland compelled President Arthur Barclay to
extend citizenship to the tribal residents of the interior as prove of "effectiveness" of
Liberia's claim to the districts adjacent to Sierra Leone. 41 One cannot overemphasize the
fact that the extension of citizenship to native Liberians was motivated more by the
anxieties of the settlers to wrestle territory from British and French colonial
aggrandizement, than by the inequities of the system or a policy to integrate their African
hosts into a national identity. Consequently, this constitutional change, even though
important, did not bring any real change to circumstances of the natives. As such, native
Liberians continued to be marginalized and exploited as slave style labor, a practice
which eventually incriminated Liberia in the Fernando Po crises. 42
These were some of the fundamental structural social, political and economic
inequalities which underlie the divisions and animosities which poisoned Liberian society
and sowed the seeds of a society destined to be in arms against itself. This is reflected in
Gustav Liebenow's apt subtitle of Chapter IV of his book "The Seeds of Discord."
Except for a few belated cosmetic reforms, no serious attempt has ever been made by
Liberia's leadership to overcome these structural deficiencies towards the integration
Liberian society. George E.S. Boley commented that "in the First Liberian Republic
despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom, justice and equality, a native or an
aboriginal Liberian was considered inferior to an Americo-Liberian by reason of his
alleged heathenism; similarly a native Librarian was not considered a full citizen unless
he was, by the standard of the settlers, completely detribalized or civilized, a concept






appreciate fully the significance of some African tribal customs."
43 As one opinion put it,
" It was ironic that in their social separateness, in the assumptions that they made about
native Africans, and in the manner in which they sought to impose their authority, the
Americo-Liberians were, at least until the 1940s, uncomfortably similar to white
minorities that dominated colonial territories elsewhere in Africa"44 Worse still, some of
the stereotypes, prejudices, and discriminations, that characterized the attitudes of the
settlers towards the natives smacked very much of the kind of racism and bigotry that
informed the rejection of these same settlers by white American society.
These dynamics underlay the ascendancy of Liberia's True Whig Party and
guaranteed and entrenched the minority Americo-Liberian domination of Liberia's
political, economic, and social life to the absolute exclusion of the majority native
Liberians. Even though some efforts were made over the period at political, economic,
and social reform, these were at best superficial and far short of the revolutionary
measures that it would take to accomplish any meaningful integration. As such, the
Americo-Liberian hegemony became so entrenched and effectively monopolized all
power in such a way that by the time of the presidency of Richard William Tolbert (1971-
1980), Liberia's leadership still remained a "closely knit oligarchy." The "upper levels of
government and the economy were still controlled by about a dozen interrelated Americo-
Liberian families."45 The Masonic Order, which emerged around 1851, rapidly became a
symbol of Americo-Liberian solidarity, and offered a forum for economic and political
power trafficking and social stratification.
Whilst adopting political party structures and forms similar to the U.S. and
indeed calling the True Whig Party the Grand Old Party (GOP ) with the elephant as its
symbol, the Liberian party political landscape differed considerably in its content. The
leadership of the GOP paralleled that of the Masonic Order Personal wealth became a
function of involvement in politics rather than entrepreneurship. Corruption among the
43 G.E. Saigbe Boley, Liberia: The Rise and Fall ofthe First Republic, New York: St. Martin
Press, 1983, p. 28.
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political elite was the norm, while poverty and destitution became the legacy of the
majority of indigenous Liberians. Eventually, opposition to the political establishment
began to emerge, organize, and heighten. The masses and students, mainly dispossessed
and bitter native Liberians, became increasingly restive, and a desperate Tolbert regime
was put on the defensive as reform-minded elements of the True Whig party contested
with status quo oriented hard-liners and the old guard.46
In the obvious turmoil that loomed in Liberia, few people seriously foresaw the
military as a force that could wrestle power from the Americo-Liberian aristocracy.
Although military coups had long become an African political phenomenon, most
politicians journalists and academics continued to hold the post-colonial military in very
low esteem. At the very best, anyone who factored the military into the political equation,
especially in Liberia, might only go as far as placing his bet on the officer corps.
Significantly, the division between officers and enlisted ranks very neatly paralleled the
settler and tribal cleavages within the wider society. 47 The officer corps, which was
mainly Americo-Liberian, was highly politicized because admission was primarily by co-
option or patronage. The elite sought to control the enlisted ranks through ethnic
stereotyping and segregation; the Loma
,
the Bassa, the Kpelle, the Kru, and others were
assumed to possess cultural traits which made them best suited for specific role as
fighters, cooks, carriers, clerks, etc.
48 The Krahn, of which then Master Sergeant Doe and
many of his co-conspirators are members, were said to make excellent musicians.
C. DOE: REFORMER OR CATALYST OF CONFLICT?
[By the] ... morning of April 12,1980, a successful coup d'etat was staged
in Monrovia by an unit of the National Guard loyal which was to a group
of seventeen non-commissioned officers and other enlisted men who
called themselves The Peoples Redemption Council (PRC) led by Master
Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe. They entered the executive mansion, the
46
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residence of the President, where they murdered Tolbert and 27 members
of the President's guard. 49
Doe cited political oppression of the Tolbert regime, corruption, unemployment,
discrimination and the high cost of living that burdened the poor as some of the reasons
for the coup. The coup was greeted throughout the country with popular approval.
Liebenow characterized the reactions to the coup as "exhilaration and trauma."50 Acting
as the chairman of the PRC, Doe ordered the Constitution suspended, banned political
parties, and released all political prisoners detained by the True Whig Party. More
precisely, political prisoners of the Tolbert regime were merely substituted in prison with
the same operatives of the regime, and other people who were not sympathetic to the
coup and who were lucky not to have been executed. However, Doe pledged that the PRC
would respect private property and reassured foreign-owned businesses that commitments
previously made would be honored. 51 Several hundred government officials, politicians
and leaders of the True Whig Party were rounded up, summarily tried by a military
tribunal and found guilty of the variety of offenses. Despite appeals by the Pope, the U.S.
and the OAU for Clemency, Doe ordered their execution on April, 22nd before television
cameras on the Monrovia beach. 52
Meanwhile, all powers of government were vested in the PRC, assisted by a
cabinet of seventeen members chosen mainly from the Liberian opposition. The new
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Liberians, but without any indication of a commitment to return to civilian rule.
According to Amos Sawyer, later President of the Liberia's Interim Government of
National Unity (IGNU), the PRC vacillated between "a populist program of
development" and "a retaliatory indigenous hegemony." However, in a rather short order,
the only consistency that quickly emerged with the PRC was its increasing
repressiveness, mismanagement, and the looting of society. Confronted with a declining
popular support, Doe had quickly evolved a constituency of members of his Krahn ethnic
group as the basis of internal support. Pandering to the Cold War sensitivities of the U.S.,
Doe held out himself as an enthusiastic anti-Communist and devout ally of the U.S, ready
to do battle with Libya's Maummar Ghaddafi and the Soviets. Through such
manipulations Doe guaranteed himself unprecedented cooperation and economic and
military assistance from Washington.
1. The U.S.-A Friend or Foe?
Throughout the period preceding the fatal overthrow of the True Whig hegemony,
U.S. policy towards Liberia vacillated between action and indifference. From 1946 to
1961, Liberia received $41 million in assistance, while between 1962 to 1980, economic
and military assistance is estimated at $ 278 million. In per capita terms, Liberia hosted
the largest Peace Corps contingent and received the greatest level of aid of any country on
the entire Africa continent, with the exception of Egypt. 53 After the coup, the Carter
53 Kramer, "Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End?" p. 5.
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administration approved an aid package which was said to be intended to enable the U.S.
"to exercise influence in the course of events."
. In subsequent years, support by the Reagan administration escalated, especially
after 1981, to $402 million between 1981 and 1985 alone. Doe met with President
Reagan in Washington and in 1982 and received his badly desired promise of continued
U.S. backing. Before visiting Washington, Doe closed the Libyan Embassy in Monrovia,
as Reagan had done in Washington, and ordered the reduction of the size of Soviet
Embassy staff. A U.S. - Liberia mutual defense pact guaranteeing staging rights on 24
hour notice at Liberia's seaports and airports for U.S. rapid deployment forces was agreed
by Doe. 54 A season of direct and extensive cooperation reminiscent of the days of the
American Colonization Society (ACS) was established under Doe.
Internally, the PRC itself had became dominated by Doe's Khran ethnic group.
Doe's government become increasingly corrupt, repressive and unscrupulous with its
critics. Ethnic infighting and splits had developed within the PRC. By October 1985, Doe
had insidiously manipulated Liberia's process of constitutional reform to guarantee
himself a civilian presidency with an election vote of 50.9 %.
Attempted coups d'etat were a frequent phenomenon and Doe responded by
surrounding himself with a Khran-dominated elite presidential guard which frequently




Washington's reaction to Doe's election fraud was that "... it established a
beginning, however imperfect."55 According to reports in The Washington Post "officials
of the National Security Council (NSA) and the CIA became determined to get tough
with Libya, the most vulnerable of the terrorism-generating states," and Liberia proved
strategic to this consideration. As such, despite Doe's repressiveness, corruption, and
human rights record, Washington indulged him. Secretary of State George Schultz visited
Liberia in 1987. Following General Accounting Office revelations of massive
mismanagement of U.S. aid funds, Monrovia handed over the supervision of government
spending to a team of experts of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID)inl988.
By the day Doe grew increasingly repressive, dictatorial and intolerable of any
form of dissent. Several coup plots and unsuccessful attempts against the regime were
reported. Doe sent a stern warning to restive university students and professors,
journalists, civil servants, politicians, etc., that he expected absolute discipline and
responsible behavior on the part of every citizen. Dissenters received imprisonment or
death by firing squad without due process. 56 Doe's ascendancy, the coup that was once
greeted with hope and enthusiasm, had quickly taken the ordinary Liberian hostage as the
population grew increasingly restive.
55
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2. The NPFL Rebel Challenge
Meanwhile, following a failed invasion by General Quiwonkpa, Doe resumed a
campaign of systematic "cleansing" against the Mano and Gio tribes of Nimba county
who he perceived supported the insurgency. The Nimba county was also believed to be
the heart of the support of the Liberian Action Party, the party which was believed to be
the true winner of the October 1985 election which Doe usurped. The indiscriminate
atrocities, murders and destruction of Nimba villages by Doe's Krahn-dominated elite
presidential guard merely heightened anti-Doe sentiments, particularly among the Manos
and Gios. Most other Liberians were generally incensed at an increasingly heavy handed
and insensitive dictatorship.
It was therefore no coincidence that when Charles Taylor launched his insurgency
on December 24, 1989, it was from the Nimba county. Taylor, variously described as
"procurement clerk" or Minister of Liberia General Services Agency, was one of the
numerous "fugitives" from Doe's repression. He is alleged to have escaped from an
American prison where he was awaiting extradition to Liberia, to stand trial on charges of
embezzlement. Taylor subsequently recruited insurgents who are thought to have been
mainly trained and armed by Libya with the assistance of Burkina Faso and Cote
d'lvoire. The reaction of Doe's Khran-dominated army was to send reinforcements to the
Nimba county. They indiscriminately attacked villages and murdered civilians, a
development which merely catalyzed an already fermenting anti-Doe sentiment. 57
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When the 13th Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of state and
Government convened in at Banjul from 28 May to 2 June, 1990, the fortunes of the
warring factions had become obvious. The NPFL had annexed about 75% of Liberia's
territory, but had already suffered its major setback following a split that occurred
between rebel leader Charles Taylor and his military Commander, Prince Yormie
Johnson. The latter broke away from Charles Taylor with a faction of fighters loyal to
him and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), declaring
war against both Taylor and Doe. With the two rival rebel factions fighting each other
and with each fighting AFL, the war had become multi-faceted in a siege for Monrovia,
the seat of government. Ironically, President Doe sent a letter to the Summit apologizing
for his inability to attend.
The Summit was characterized by an unprecedented enthusiasm for integration as
one "regional strongman" after another called for integration, solidarity, sub-regional
fraternity, etc. Indeed, Captain Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, the outgoing Chairman
of ECOWAS, exhorted member states to "look beyond our limited national
boundaries,"58 and embrace the virtues of regional integration. The Burkinabe leader had
been busy interfering with Liberia by facilitating supplies and communication lines to the
NPFL. The consensus of the Banjul Summit was "the need for the sub-region to drop all
pretenses and enhance ECOWAS' operations since Africa cannot afford to exist in a
make believe situation immune to the radical changes taking place all over the world"59
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IV. THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
(ECOWAS), THE SMC AND ECOMOG
The ECOWAS Treaty was signed in Lagos, Nigeria on 28 May 1975 by fifteen
West African States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo. The Cape Verde Islands signed the treaty a year later, in 1977, to become the
sixteenth member state.
The objectives of the Community were the promotion of cooperation and
development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry,
transport telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce,
monetary and financial questions. It also sought cooperation and development in social
and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples,
increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its
members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent. 60
The ECOWAS Treaty provided for the following basic institutional structure: the
Authority of the Heads of State and Governments as the principal decision making body;
the Council of Ministers as next in the hierarchy; the Executive Secretariat, headed by the
Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the Authority; the ECOWAS Fund for
mobilizing financial resources for Community projects; and a number of specialized and
technical commissions to facilitate the functioning of the institutional arrangements.
In this chapter, I argue that because the membership of ECOWAS fell into the
colonial Francophone (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Guinea, Mali Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Togo), Anglophone (The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone),
and Luciphone (Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau) divide, it bequeathed to the community a
profound legacy of colonial rivalry which was later to undermine and render stillborn the
grandiose aspirations of its founding fathers. Further, I contend that a more active and
interventionist neocolonial French policy, colonial cultural, linguistic, and structural
60 ECOWAS Treaty, Article 1, 28 May 1975, Lagos, Nigeria.
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economic political differences, coupled with weak and undeveloped economies and sub-
regional rivalries combined to make the attainment of viable cooperation difficult, if not
impossible.
A. ECOWAS : THE SEEDS OF SLUMBER (1975-1989)
By the mere timing of their independence, most West African states became
victims of the divisive struggle for spheres of influence between the East and the West.
Most newly independent states still tugged along even if grudgingly with their colonial
masters, who quickly evolved various post-colonial frameworks, such as the British
Commonwealth of Independent States and Frances' La Communuate to facilitate
continuing influence and control. Moreover, almost all new states were manifestly
reluctant and sensitive to compromising their newly gained independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity to regional, continental, or supra-national political or economic
organizations. Consequently, after failed efforts to foster a continental political and
economic union under the banner of Pan Africanism, and to some extent the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), the idea ofECOWAS did not emerge until 1975. 61 This climate
of deep suspicion which characterized the signing of the ECOWAS Treaty made it a
revolutionary gesture of great symbolic value.
Notwithstanding the grandiose and ambitious ideas, of its founders commitment
to such a noble enterprise has been dismal. ECOWAS Summits have been mere talking
shops, where member states have been quick to adopt decisions, resolutions and
protocols, which often ended up unratified and far from implementation. This slumber
was reflected by the Executive Secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu, in his choice of theme for the
Summit Meetings of June 1989. In a remarkable address entitled "A Time for
Implementation," Dr. Bundu "presented a picture of nonchalance, half-heartedness, and
61
" Stepping up Progress in the Community," Contact, The Publication ofECOWAS, No. 4,
October, 1992, p. 6.
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near neglect which have characterized the attitudes of most member states since 1975, the
year the organization was established."62
1. Record of Inaction
The general apathy and passivity of member states was manifested in every aspect
of community activity ranging from the accumulation of arrears arising from the non-
payment of budgetary and capital contributions, non-repayment of loans, non-attendance
or inadequate representation at ECOWAS meetings, non-ratification of protocols and
conventions, failure to respond to community requests for information or technical
assistance, etc.
63
Only Cote d'lvoire, Nigeria, and Togo, three out of 16 states could boast of
making a consistent effort to pay their contributions regularly as of 1989. The outstanding
arrears of contributions from member states to the Secretariat's budget alone stands at
nearly 17 million units of account (about 20 million U.S. dollars) as of March 31, 1989.
This shortfall is estimated to represent about three times the size of the annual budget and
as such conveys a rough picture of how well the Secretariat must have been operating.
Significantly, two member states have been in arrears for 10 years, while none of the
remaining 14 member states had fully liquidated their arrears. This state of apathy and
non-commitment persisted even after the Chairman of ECOWAS, Sir Dawda Jawara,
personally signed appeals to Community Heads of State and Ministers to wake up to their
most basic obligations to the organization. Additionally, Dr. Bundu had to travel around
the sub-region, holding direct discussions with Community Heads of State and
governments to persuade them to honor their outstanding contributions, but to no avail. 64
Given its practically bankrupt financial standing, how could such a dismally coping
organization contemplate a mission of the scale of ECOMOG in the absence of a
compelling motivation?
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Yet another indication of inaction by ECOWAS was in relation to the ratification
and implementation of community conventions and protocols. According to the Treaty,
Community protocols and conventions come into force only after ratification by all
members, or remain unbinding on member states until they have been ratified by that
particular state, or until ratified by two thirds of the member states. Since 1978, the
Authority has adopted and signed twenty-three Community conventions and protocols
that need to be ratified by each member state. However, as of June 1989, only one had
been ratified by all member states. Of the remaining twenty-two protocols, Nigeria and
Togo ratified nineteen, while overall only ten protocols had been ratified by more than
fifty percent of all the member states. Most member states had not ratified more than
three of four protocols and no member state had ratified all the twenty-three
instruments. 65 Consequently, if one measured commitment on the basis of protocol
ratification, the reality seemed to be clearly that member states cannot even be said to be
committed in principle to the deliberations and consensus of their meetings.
However, having catalogued its chronic lack of commitment and performance, it
is important to acknowledge that within these constraints, ECOWAS has recorded its
"widow's might" in the slow drive towards regional integration. Most importantly,
ECOWAS has been of invaluable symbolic importance. 66 It has also pursued the
implementation of various telecommunication projects (described as INTEL COM 1 by
some member states); the construction of the Trans-West African highways; the adoption
and application of the ECOWAS Brown Card Scheme (common insurance) in member
states; the establishment of the ECOWAS Computer Center in Lome; the disbursement of
loans by the ECOWAS Fund to various regional projects in member states; and the
construction of a permanent headquarters of the Community in Lome and Abuja. 67
After over twenty years of its existence, the attainment of the ECOWAS stated
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west Africa sub-region is still very much an elusive dream. Further, it was hoped that
among other things, ECOWAS would provide a framework for transcending national
pride, intra-state rivalries, animosities, and more importantly, the colonial hangovers that
had resulted mainly from the cultural antipathies transposed from the British, French, and
to a small extent the Portuguese during the colonial period.
B. THE SMC TO ECOMOG: SLUMBER TO ACTION
The pro-integration atmosphere of the May 1989 Summit was very conducive to
the proposal by the Nigerian Leader, President Babangida, that an ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee (SMC) be set up and tasked with mediating conflicts in the sub-
region. He argued, and rightly so, that the need to guarantee security in the sub-region
was prerequisite to the operations of ECOWAS, whose noble ideals were anchored on
solidarity, unity, mutual trust and good neighborliness. 68 Given the role of Cote d'lvoire
and Burkina Faso in the Taylor conspiracy, as well as the continued guarantee of
supplies, lines of communications, logistics, and war munitions, one wonders whether
these statements of sub-regional patriotism were veiled indictments of those who were by
then known to be part of the conspiracy that had brought Liberia to the brink of total
destruction. In short order, the SMC was already addressing the Liberia conflict.
The former Gambian President told me, "we all knew by now that Burkina Faso
and Cote d'lvoire were involved in routing weapons from Libya to the NPFL. We knew
that some of the NPFL had been trained by Libya, and they included dissidents from our
countries."69 Subsequently I found the most classical revelation yet of the motivations of
West African leaders in the following words:
One aspect of the Liberian conflict of course is the involvement of sub
regional citizens apart from Liberian citizens, mainly on the side of
Charles Taylor. ...Well as you know there are training camps in Libya
where dissidents from various West African countries have been trained.
67
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Personal interview of the author with Sir Dawda Jawara, Former Gambian President, July
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Over years they are there from The Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana
and possibly Nigeria, and we have information that a good many of these
are fighting on the side of Taylor. ...If Charles Taylor, with the support of
what I may call mercenaries from the other countries for the sub-region,
were to come into power by force, one can imagine the implications it
would have for sub regional stability. 70
One cannot belabor the point given such a self-explanatory statement. Therefore,
it should suffice to say that given the nature of the concern reflected in this statement, the
object of regional leaders could not have been humanitarian. ECOMOG was intended to
achieve the important task of routing Taylor's NPFL in order to ensure, as Gulick put it,
that the developments within Liberia were not dangerous to ECOMOG member states.
1. Begging Questions?
The decision ofECOWAS to constitute the SMC raises some important questions.
This is especially true because some member states, notably Burkina Faso and Cote
dTvoire, subsequently denounced the ECOMOG as unlawful and unjust, the former
doing so publicly. Others such as Togo, a member of the SMC, backed down on a
promise to contribute troops to the force. Even though it can be argued that ECOWAS
consists of sovereign states free to do business in the ways they deem preferable, the
resort to the SMC appears more deliberate than otherwise.
Recourse has been made on certain occasions to Mediation Committees by the
OAU. But why did ECOWAS leaders not resort to the mechanisms they have established
for intervention in the context of the ECOWAS Treaty and relevant Protocols? This is
important because of charges by Taylor's allies in and out of the sub-region that without
an ECOWAS mandate ECOMOG is an unlawful and provocative intrusion into Liberia's
internal affairs. The accusation that the SMC lacked an ECOWAS mandate and therefore
that ECOMOG was illegal stemmed mainly from the membership of the SMC and the
70 Kaye Whiteman, " Towards Peace in Liberia," West Africa, 26 November - 2 December 1990,
p. 2894.
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obscure nature of its mandate. 71 These controversies and rifts within ECOWAS
strengthened Taylor's diplomatic intransigence as well as his military confidence to the
extent that he declared war against the peace enforcement force. He called ECOMOG "a
band of foreign mercenaries brought in by Doe to kill Liberians."72
Why did the proponents of the SMC not allude the ECOWAS protocols? An even
more curious issue is the question of the membership of the SMC. Was it schemed or it
was merely accidental? Why did the SMC subsequently invite Cote dTvoire, Guinea and
Sierra Leone as automatic participants because of the presumed proximity to the conflict?
Could it be that such an invitation was extended in the full knowledge that that Cote
dTvoire was more likely to decline given its known complicity with Taylor? If this were
the case, it is arguable that the scheme of ECOMOG was to end up with a membership
that consisted of regimes with a shared perception of the regional security implications of
the war in Liberia. In theory and practice, such a move is crucial to the prospects of
alliance cohesion, especially as the cost of intervention in terms of lives, mobilization,
and duration of engagement increases.
I argue that General Babangida and his allies had a clear perception of the
potential threat to regional stability, in terms of triggering one insurgency after another.
They recognized that if the war in Liberia were not checked, each of them could wake up
only to find a hostile regime next door over which they had no leverage. Whether it was
accidental or a product of cold calculations, one could credit the achievement of
consensus on the formation of the SMC and the choice of its membership as an act of
decisive strategic importance. Most importantly, working through the SMC reduced and
simplified the range of opinions over which convergence or consensus would be sought.
This approach also enabled ECOMOG members to circumvent the traditional sources of
controversy and disagreement, the Francophone Anglophone divide. Subsequent attempts
by the Francophone bandwagon to convene a meeting of the Authority was declined by
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ECOWAS Chairman, Sir Dawda Jawara, and ECOMOG states flatly refused to attend.
According to Sir Dawda, the Ivorian leader was so frustrated about ECOMOG that, "even
though we had always been friends, and he referred to me as the second doyen, he refused
to meet me unless I convened a meeting of the Authority."73
This was crucial because even though the outcome of the war in Liberia had
implications for each and every member state of the community, the threat was much
more severe to nations closest to the conflict. The cohesion one could expect within the
alliance, in this case ECOWAS, and in particular ECOMOG, is a function of threat
perception. This seems to be precisely why General Babangida contended that "any
misunderstanding or conflicting signals from member states of ECOWAS are
disagreements over procedural issues and not over the fundamental role of ECOWAS in
Liberia."
74 While there may have been consensus on the need to intervene or mediate in
Liberia, the interpretation one would put on the scope and dynamics of such a mandate
depends on the countries' threat perception and need for stability.
It must be emphasized that proximity to the threat in this context is far more
embracing than physical proximity. Countries that have weak national security
capabilities and legitimacy crises such as The Gambia perceived the trends in Liberia as a
threat to Banjul, even though located a considerable physical distance away. Others, such
as the Ghanaian and Nigerian hegemons with demonstrated regime survival capabilities
were nevertheless plagued with legitimacy crises and potential instability. They therefore
saw the strategic security need to preempt the insurgency formula before it became an
attractive precedent to West African dissidents and exiles. Of course Sierra Leone and
Guinea fall into the category of states which are proximate both physically and in terms
of other dynamics. Importantly, it is the parallel political, economic social and security
dynamics of sub-regional regimes that creates a more or less similar national security, and
regime stability concerns among West African leaders.
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V. MOTIVATIONS FOR INTERVENTION:
HUMANITARIANISM VERSUS REALPOLITIK
A. HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS
West African leaders and policy makers have argued vigorously that sub-regional
states were primarily motivated to form and deploy ECOMOG into Liberia by
humanitarian concerns. The ECOWAS SMC in its final communique explained the
rational for ECOMOG as follows: "...presently, there is a government in Liberia which
cannot govern and the contending factions which are holding the entire population as
hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other necessaries of life."75 In a
subsequent statement, ECOWAS was even more categorical about the principal
motivation for ECOMOG. The statement emphasized the necessity for "stopping the
senseless killings of innocent civilians, nationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian
people restore their democratic institutions."76 Since then, various African leaders and
policy makers have continued to trumpet the "noblesse," African fraternity, and good
neighborliness that provoked the formation of ECOMOG. 77 In typical fashion,
Ambassador Joseph Iroha, a Nigerian diplomat (who is said to have represented
ECOWAS in Monrovia for several years after the war began) stated: "we could not
understand how the U.S. government with its long-standing relationship with Liberia,
could remain so aloof ." West African states sent troops to stop the fratricidal killing, he
said, because "we couldn't allow this sort of thing to continue."78
Admittedly, by the time the multiple factions pitched each other in a fierce battle
for Monrovia, Liberia had long descended below the abyss of the "Hobbesian jungle." It
75 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, "Final Communique
of First Session, Document 54/B/I August 7, 1990."
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is also a matter of fact that there were other ECOWAS nationals trapped in the fighting,
as well as an influx of refugees across the sub-region. For instance, it is estimated that
over half of Liberia's population of 2.6 million was displaced internally (the population
of Monrovia grew from 600,000 to approximately one million at the peak of the fighting).
Externally, Liberians who took refuge in neighboring countries were estimated at
600,000. 79 After all, even the U.S., President Doe's closest ally before the outbreak of the
conflict, went in to rescue its own.
However, the fact that most of the criticism that ECOMOG has drawn resulted
from the fact that its operations were not primarily directed at a humanitarian cause. This
raises basic questions about the validity of this claim. ECOMOG did rescue ECOWAS
nationals and even some Westerners who were trapped in the fighting. But were these
incidental to their presence or it was the main focus of the intervention. What happened to
West African diplomats who were caught up in Monrovia? Did they have to make their
own way to safety, or they were ever rescued? Did ECOMOG's military operations target
their missions and diplomatic premises where most of their citizens were concentrated or
they were focused on other strategic objectives, such as blocking an NPFL rebel take
over?
Without doubt, ECOMOG's extensive initial mandate alone far exceeds the scope
of humanitarian intervention, however ambitious. In addition, their military operations
pointed more to the strategic objective of a determined effort to stall and flush out' the
NPFL in particular. It seems to me rather curious and out rightly fantastic that a
humanitarian force intervening in an internal conflict under the circumstances of
ECOMOG, should declare from the onset and intention to help the Liberians restore their
democratic institutions.
Even though ECOWAS did admit some strategic security concerns, these tended
to be advanced as merely peripheral or secondary to their more supreme and high moral
humanitarian persuasions. For example, former Nigerian military dictator, Gen.
Babangida is quoted as saying that,
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. . .Unless arrested the carnage in that country (Liberia ) would have spilled
over to neighboring countries, leading to external non-African intervention
and thereby posing a security threat to us all. We therefore decided to send
our troops to participate in this laudable peacekeeping mission. We have
repeatedly declared that Nigeria has no territorial interest in that country or
indeed any where outside our own border. 80
This statement, typifies the "double talk" and "ambivalence" that characterized
most of the pretenses of sub-regional leaders. Even if it is granted that the motive for
ECOMOG was to prevent the conflict from spilling over and thereby pre-empt the
intervention of a non-African force which would constitute a security threat, the rationale
would be strategic. In the Nigerian leader's own logic, the threat of a spillage of the
conflict and prospect of hostile foreign intervention was the ultimate motivation for
ECOMOG. But what of Cote d'lvoire which shares an extensive border with Liberia. Did
Abidjan not care about a spillover? After all neither Nigeria, Guinea or the Gambia has a
common border with Liberia.
The heart of my argument is that notwithstanding any important impact other
factors or theories may have had on the decision of West African leaders to form
ECOMOG, the single most significant motivation was the mutually perceived threat that
the rebel victory in Liberia would pose to the political stability and legitimacy of their
governments. This argument is not to suggest that the fear of the actual and potential
consequences of a rebel military victory was the exclusive cause for ECOMOG. This
contentions that ulterior strategic motive was the driving force may be better appreciated
when the responses of ECOMOG states is viewed in contrast with the responses of their
mainly Francophone neighbors. Indeed, the Liberian civil war, like most other complex
social and political upheavals elicited multiple concerns. These obviously included a
legitimate concern for the humanitarian catastrophe and brutish destruction of life and
property that was unleashed by the warring factions on unarmed civilians, women, and
children. Besides, I have already alluded to the unprecedented influx of refugees, a
development which brought in its trail other economic, social, political, and security
Building and Rehabilitation Efforts, Doc/Rev/5, p.l June, 21, 1994.
80 The African Guardian, (Lagos), April 21, 1991, p. 13.
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consequences. 81 For these and other reasons outside the scope of this paper it is well
beyond dispute that humanitarian considerations may have weighed to some extent on the
minds of sub-regional leaders. However, I contend that on a scale of importance of all the
factors that the principal actors of ECOWAS took into account, the most dominant
concern was the security, stability, and the legitimacy of their own regimes. Indeed, in the
absence of that motivation, humanitarian concerns alone would not have sufficed to
precipitate the unprecedented sub-regional alliance that culminated into ECOMOG.
B. THE SMC'S HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: RHETORIC OR
REALITY?
The Banjul Summit of Heads of State and Government, at which the ECOWAS
SMC was formed, called on the Liberian warring factions to observe a mandatory cease-
fire. The Authority tasked the new SMC with the initiative of mediating a resolution to
the conflict. Needless to say, no heed was paid to the "admonition" or "decree" of the
Authority, the highest body of ECOWAS, to impose a cease-fire. Consequently, the First
Session of the ECOWAS SMC in Banjul, 6-7 August, 1990 determined that
the failure of the warring parties to cease hostilities had led to the massive
destruction of property and the massacre by all the parties of thousands of
innocent civilians, including foreign nationals, women and children, some
of whom sought sanctuary in churches, hospitals, diplomatic, missions,
and under Red Cross protection, contrary to all recognized standards of
civilized behavior. Worst still, there are corpses lying unburied in the
streets of cities and towns which could lead to a serious outbreak of an
epidemic. The civil war has also trapped thousands of foreign nationals,
including ECOWAS citizens without any means of escape or protection. 82
As a result, the SMC resolved "...to assume their responsibility of ensuring that
peace and stability is maintained within the sub-region and in the African continent as a
81 Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, "Refugee Flows As Grounds for International Action,"
International Security, Summer, 1996, Vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 47 & 48. The authors observe that
Guinea and the Ivory Coast alone absorbed about 750,00 refugees, the latter without setting up a
single camp.
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whole."83 Although this rationale has been repeatedly emphasized by various African
politicians and policy makers, the primary emphasis for ECOMOG has continuously been
laid on humanitarian and fraternal concerns. For example, in his justification of the role
of ECOMOG, Nigerian leader General Babangida lamented that "Our critics tend to
ignore the appalling human catastrophe which the Liberian crisis has created for us in the
Sub-Region."84 The Nigerian leader repeated the toll of massacres, destruction of property
and invasion of sanctuaries, and queried whether Nigeria and other responsible countries
in the sub-region should "stand by and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass
graveyard?" Further, he argued that, "all we in Nigeria and the rest of West Africa need to
concentrate upon is attaining a cease-fire, leading to a lasting peace and the consequent
easing or ending of the suffering of our brothers and sisters in Liberia rather than aiming
at scoring conflictual political points and exacerbating the crisis and agonies of all
concerned."85
In respect of displaced persons, he alluded to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as having said that the problem of 660,000
refugees outside Liberia and another 500,000 inside Liberia make it one of the worst
refugee situations the world was facing.
Because of the numerous vulnerabilities of most sub-regional governments, the
unprecedented influx of refugees was an unsettling and unmanageable experience,
especially in terms of its national security implications. Moreover, most sub-regional
states had no previous experience of dealing with such huge numbers of refugees and so
lacked any form of organizational or institutional framework for responding to such an
influx. Consequently, Guinea and Cote dTvoire, for instance, are said to have absorbed
over 750,000 refugees, the latter without establishing a single refugee camp. 86
The humanitarian justification of ECOMOG is supported by the contention of
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of gross violations abroad: they breed refugees, exiles and dissidents who come knocking
at your door—and we must chose between bolting the doors, thus increasing the misery
and violence outside, and opening them at some cost to our own well-being."87 Even
though Hoffman was commenting on the dilemmas of responding to the international
refugee crisis in general, his insights aptly illustrate some of the real choices that the war
in Liberia imposed on sub-regional governments.
Even more frightening was the fact that the conflict, which began as a popular and
welcome uprising against Doe's unrelenting dictatorship, had lost this character. Most
rival factions were consolidating along ethnic or tribal lines. In any case what began as a
popular armed rebellion was discomforting enough, given the striking parallels between
Doe's regime and most other sub-regional regimes.
C. REALPOLITIK RATIONALE FOR ECOMOG
Liberia was without doubt a humanitarian disaster and as such a legitimate case
for intervention. However, the factual state of affairs in the civil war generated even
deeper concerns. ECOMOG's claim that it was motivated by humanitarian concerns and
sub-regional fraternal sympathies is at best an explanation that may be easily marketable
to gullible domestic populations and the international community. In my view, by mid-
1 990, the trends in the conflict had fully engaged the national security concerns of some
sub-regional governments, particularly because of the precedent value of what was going
on in Liberia, and the prospects that the fighting might spill over across the sub-region.
In addition, regional leaders were also concerned about the prospect of a hostile
rebel regime of dubious credentials, which would also constitute a precedent. Further,
there was the teeming outflow of refugees across the porous borders into neighboring
countries, as well as the many non-combatants who were trapped in the fighting. These
apprehensions were exacerbated by abundant intelligence, which suggested the
involvement of dissidents and exiles from other West African states with the core of the
86 Dowty and Loescher, p. 47.
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NPFL. 88 Suspicions of the future intentions of the NPFL were further confounded by the
manifestly hostile statements and actions of the NPFL directed at other sub-regional
governments including armed attacks and looting of the embassies of Ghana, Guinea,
Nigeria, etc. 89 A large numbers of civilians, women and children, mostly nationals of
countries who had sought shelter in their embassies, were taken hostage; many of them
were killed and embassy property was looted and destroyed. 90 Moreover, the slaughter of
civilians and non-combatants became selectively ethnic. Doe's Krahn-dominated
presidential guard had earlier indiscriminately murdered Gio and Mano civilians, burning
down entire villages for their perceived connivance and support of the NPFL.91 Doe's
reaction was precipitated by previous tribal animosities following the dissent between
Doe and his former ally, General Quiwonkpa, a Gio. The NPFL had long hit back with
the indiscriminate killing of any member of Doe's Krahn ethnic group and the
Mandingos, a commercial tribespeople who the NPFL accused of siding with the AFL by
fingering alleged rebel sympathizers. 92 Similarly, Prince Johnson's INPFL had become
notorious for its ruthlessness against non-combatants. A striking peak of this anarchy was
the mindless slaughter on July 30, 1990 of about 600 Gio and Mano civilians, women and
children who had sought refuge in Saint Peter's Lutheran Church in Monrovia. 93
However, I contend that such fraternal sympathies, short of the more fundamental
strategic concern for their own political stability and the legitimacy of their regimes, may
have been inadequate to precipitate the deployment ofECOMOG. This more fundamental
national security concern may have been imperative because most sub-regional regimes
share the same political vulnerabilities as well as legitimacy challenges very now and
again become potential issues of contention between incumbents and disgruntled or
88 The former Gambian president, Sir Dawda Jawara emphasized in an interview with the author
the presence of Gambian exiles m the High Command of Taylor's NPFL. Similarly, various
confidential briefs to ECOMOG troops often alluded to this.
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oppressed interest groups within the various community states. Therefore, if the NPFL
insurgency formula were permitted to crystallize without difficulty into a rule of political
engagement many other political opponents may be induced to make recourse to
insurgencies.
1 . Cross-Border Activities of Refugees
The Liberian civil war itself is an example of the potential threat of the influx of
refugees to national security, political stability and regime legitimacy. Significantly, the
war was started through an insurgency by Liberian exiles, with the alleged assistance of
other dissidents and exiles from the sub-region, the NPFL, who invaded Liberia from
bases on the Ivorian-Liberian border.
Almost invariably, some elements within a refugee population tend to reorganize
and launch attacks into their countries of origin in a bid to destabilize the regimes from
which they are fleeing. For example, in 1981 it was some Liberian exiles who united to
form the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) in Freetown,
Sierra Leone. ULIMO then proceeded to join the war, operating initially from bases in
Sierra Leone. ULIMO became a force to reckon with, dislodging the NPFL and capturing
the important mineral-rich counties of Bomi and Grand Cape Mount. The movement
eventually split into what became known as ULIMO-K, headed by Alhaji Kromah, and
Mandingo-dominated, and ULIMO-J, headed by General Roosevelt Johnson and Krahn-
dominated.
Since refugees often remain in or near border areas, the control of cross-border
armed raids and other illegal activities such as terrorism and smuggling which are
especially difficult to manage. This is especially true where governments are weak,
corrupt and incompetent, and are barely able to exert authority and force beyond their
capitals. These cross-border activities often lead to provocation, confrontations, and
ultimately hostilities between governments, and in some cases, governments and rebel
factions.
After the November 1985 failed coup by General Quiwonkpa, Doe's immediate
move was to declare Liberia's borders with Sierra Leone and Cote d'lvoire as
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permanently closed. This was to preempt external reinforcements from across the border.
"The Liberian Secretary General to the Mano River Union was recalled while the level of
hostile rhetoric between the leaders escalated."94 This action created disagreements and
tensions between the regimes in FreeTown, Conakry and Abidjan over aid to the
insurgents. Similarly, there has been direct and indirect accusations against
Ouagadougou, Abidjan and Conakry of complicity in the activities of the NPFL and
ULIMO across shared borders. 95
For example, West Africa carried a report that a dissident force of over 1,000
Krahns and Mandingos had massed on the Guinea-Liberia border to restore Doe's people
to predominance. The report alleged that former Doe Minister, Dr. Boima Fahnbulleh,
who escaped to Freetown after being linked with Gen. Quiwonkpa's failed rebellion in
1985, had a private army ostensibly waiting for the right moment to enter the fray.96
What is crucial here is that in the context of a civil war where intelligence is rudimentary
and ethnic hostilities are intense, such rumors can lead to preemptive attacks against
suspected governments and thus widen the war.
In fact, President Momoh of Sierra Leone, reacting to a threat by Taylor to raid
and punish Sierra Leone for its role in ECOMOG, alluded to the prospect of the spread of
the war when he said, " If even he sends his MIG 17s or 20s ... attacking Sierra Leone,
from anywhere would amount to a declaration of war in five countries in the region as the
ECOMOG thing is not just a Sierra Leone affair. Some ECOMOG countries border with
Taylor's strongholds which makes easy incursions possible."97
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Such statements illuminate the fundamental strategic motivations of ECOMOG.
While President Momoh claims that Taylor should show gratitude to ECOMOG for
assisting Liberia, Momoh is in reality defending his own strategic interests. ECOMOG
intervened in the first place to preempt or address the apprehension of Momoh and other
regional leaders that otherwise a hostile rebel regime in Monrovia would easily
destabilize their countries and undermine their regimes. It is significant that a few years
later Momoh' s precise fears materialized in a coup against his regime.
Also, air strikes, raids and search and destroy missions across these borders pose
the problem of dragging host countries into the conflict, and in some cases they offer a
"legitimate" pretense for armed exiled groups to drag other host countries into the
conflict. For example, ECOMOG conducted bombardments against what they perceived
as NPFL bases in the Ivorian border town of Danane, as well as against bridges thought
to be supply lines around the Liberia-Ivorian border. However, Abidjan contended that
this was an act of provocation which targeted Ivorian civilian targets and led to losses of
life and property. Any of these attacks could have escalated into an all out war, especially
because an exchange of hostilities between ECOMOG and any non-ECOMOG state
could trigger hostilities with all ECOMOG troop contributing states.
In yet other cases, refugee host countries themselves helped arm the refugee
fighting groups as a weapon against the country of origin but then found themselves
unable to control the consequences of doing so. These were the trends in parts of the
Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region of Eastern and Central Africa,
etc.
If it were granted that ECOMOG was motivated by the humanitarian catastrophe,
it might still be argued that the real motive for the intervention was the instability and
burden on regional states rather than the mere concern for the victims of the catastrophe.
Threats to regional stability, peace and security are caused not only by the flow of
refugees, but more importantly by the developments or conditions that precipitated the
refugee flows are in the first place.
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2. The Composition ofECOMOG
As this brief overview of the internal social, political and in some cases
economic structures shows, most ECOWAS member states have comparable internal
political pressures and similar national security vulnerabilities. As such, at the critical
time period when the decision to launch ECOMOG was reached, the line-up of pro-
ECOMOG regimes raised begging questions as to their possible motivations.
President Babangida of Nigeria, Rawlings of Ghana, Lansana Conte of Guinea,
and Momoh of Sierra Leone were all of the authoritarian creed of African leaders. Each
of them came to power through a military coup, and without exception, each had a
demonstrated a consistent record of self-perpetuation. Even though the Gambian
President, Sir Dawda Jawara, is the singular exception, he is thought to have an even
more distinguished record of having preserved his wield on political power since leading
his country to independence in 1965. These common features which the principal actors
of ECOMOG share with the beleaguered Doe may have exacerbated Taylor's suspicions
of the motives ofECOMOG, a perception reflected in his reference to ECOMOG regimes
as a club of dictators whose plan was to assist Doe, one of their kind. 98
Similarly, Max A. Sesay argues that ECOMOG was a move by corrupt
,
repressive and non-democratic and self-perpetuating regimes to save the military
dictatorship of Doe from collapse." I would agree with Sesay, but with the qualification
that ECOMOG was not motivated by a desire to save Doe, but rather was a preemptive
defense by similar regimes of their own political stability and the legitimacy which they
perceived to be remotely threatened. Of course if the motive of ECOMOG bothered on
the regimes being corrupt, undemocratic and self perpetuating one may legitimately
contend that these credentials are by no means the monopoly of the SMC member states
alone. Indeed, the accomplished veteran of the art of political self-perpetuation and
regime preservation, President Houphouet Boigny was not part of this line-up. He was in
fact opposed to ECOMOG. As I have already argued, this bothered on the fact that his




dynamics of sub-regional politics and security. Moreover, the Ivorian leaders complicity
with Taylor's insurgency undermined any possible threat that a successful rebel regime in
Monrovia would otherwise have posed for regimes of his credentials.
3. Rescue of Doe or Self-Preservation?
In my view, the policy outcomes triggered by such legitimate and realpolitik
concerns of ECOMOG were however largely misunderstood by the NPFL in particular.
The initiation ofECOMOG in the political context I have already described was bound to
be unwelcome by sub-regional players, such as Cote dTvoire and its Francophone
bedmates. But principal players in the conflict itself, such as the NPFL, were to be
expected to show even greater skepticism that ECOMOG was a grand ploy to restore
Doe's hold on political power. 10°
The extensive friendship between Nigeria's General Ibrahim Babangida and
President Doe was an open secret within West Africa. Among other things,
...President Babangida had cultivated friendly ties with the Liberian
dictator Samuel Doe. President Doe, for example, had seen to it that the
University of Liberia bestowed an honorary degree upon the Nigerian
leader, who in turn made a generous donation to what became the
Babangida School of international Affairs. Nigeria played a major
facilitating role in rescheduling 30 million dollars of Liberian debt with
the African Development Bank and was reported to have supplied arms to
the Doe regime. 101
Given this background, Taylor, some sub-regional politicians, and political
commentators fell prey to the tempting conclusion that "...because the mere suggestion
of a Nigerian operation to rescue the embattled dictator could be expected to arouse
antagonism, Nigeria chose to intervene in the civil strife through ECOWAS." 102
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But many would also argue that Nigeria's preoccupation appeared to transcend
the desire to rescue Doe, and seemed to be rooted more in geostrategic security
calculations than friendship or the even more popular explanation of sub-regional
fraternity. This is because from a security conscious perspective the Liberian conflict
constituted a direct challenge to the shaky political stability and spurious legitimacy of
Lagos. Consequently, beyond the need to help a friend was the not too perceptible need to
preempt the regional spread of what was from all indications an obnoxious precedent and
to preserve the stability and legitimacy of some regional governments.
Moreover, the interpretation that ECOMOG was a conspiracy by sub-regional
dictators to bail out an entrapped comrade is in my view not plausible in terms of the
mandate of ECOMOG, even prior to its deployment. The SMC had already decided that
Doe must be asked to leave. According to the Nigerian leader, "It was accepted that in the
Liberian crisis Doe was a factor and that he constituted a problem and all of us were
desirous for peace." 103 Why would West African leaders assume the prerogative of
determining that Doe must leave? At the time ECOMOG intervened, it was clear that Doe
was either going to have to flee or be forced out by either the NPFL or the INPFL. The
question of Doe's departure is therefore a non-issue. It has even been argued that the
intervention ofECOMOG prolonged the existence of Doe and prolonged the suffering of
the Liberian people. 104
I argue that regional leaders had a more strategic goal of rescuing themselves by
establishing an influence in the processes as to how the power vacuum in Liberia would
got filled, under what circumstances, and by whom. The experience of West African
politicians shows that having friendly sub-regional neighbors is a fundamental
prerequisite for regime survival and legitimacy in the turbulent dynamics of African
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legitimacy challenges emanate from internal or external sources, or a combination of
both. Significantly the "Final Communique of the SMC" outlined the following as
objectives of intervention: the observance and maintenance of a cease-fire, establishment
of interim government, observance of the general and Presidential elections in Liberia,
etc.
105 However, the suggestion of a rescue in terms of a "Marcos-styled" departure for
Doe rather than a total defeat and death, can be hardly contested. Otherwise, there is no
evidence in the conduct and or pronouncements of the members of the SMC to suggest a
scheme to perpetuate Doe.
It would seem that Taylor's obsession to ascend to Liberia's presidency, the
attainment of which was only forestalled by ECOMOG, appear to have clouded his
strategic judgment. Otherwise, there were abundant subtle and direct indicators that the
primary interest of pro-ECOMOG states was to ensure that they wielded an influence in
the developments in Liberia in order to preempt the installation of a hostile and
unpredictable regime next door. In other words, unless a particular sub-regional regime
has alternative security guarantees it could not afford to be disinterested in the process of
change in Liberia. Therefore, it should be of little surprise that the majority of passive
regimes were of the Francophone extraction.
This cocktail of mutual suspicions and the effort to ensure political survival was
further catalyzed by Taylor's intransigence, unpredictability, and hostility towards
ECOMOG even at stages when the leaders of ECOMOG were bending backwards to
accommodate his inflexible posture. It would seem that Taylor was blinded by his
ambition to be president at all costs and was urged on by allies (Burkina Faso, and in
particular, Cote d'lvoire) who had their own mixed motives. As a result, the NPFL failed
to avail itself of earlier windows of opportunity to end the fighting without necessarily
negotiating away Taylor's proximity to power. There may also have been a mutual
convergence of decidedly mixed motives in keeping the massacres going. This may have
been a ploy to enable Taylor to effectively plunder the mineral and timber areas which
war. Taylor castigated ECOMOG as armed invaders, whom he accused of killing Libenan
civilians.
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had fallen to the NPFL before law and order was restored to Liberia. In addition, French
business interests, which were actively engaged in these transactions and in the lucrative
barter trade of diamonds and timber for weapons, had no desire in seeing the civil war
brought to a close.
4. Sub-Regional Relationships
By the time the NPFL finally manifested itself as the dominant faction in the
Liberian crisis, previous sub-regional trends had already shaped Taylor's relationship
with key regimes and personalities within ECOWAS. For example, it was widely
rumored that Taylor's initial attempt to solicit support for his plans to unseat Doe from
Ghana had failed and consequently landed him in the "cooler" (a popular Ghanaian term
for political imprisonment). One wonders what "hospitality" he might have received as a
"guest of the state" given the phobia of the Rawlings regime for anything that went by the
name dissident. As a result of the revolutionary background of the Rawlings regime, it
generated every conceivable kind of refugees, exiles and dissidents. Various of these
dissident groups had for many years made several unsuccessful armed attempts to
destabilize the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), as the Rawlings
dictatorship was called. Most of these incursions had been from neighboring states. Thus,
sub-regional political dynamics had serious implications for the stability and legitimacy
of the PNDC.
Significantly, on August 15-16 1989, Ghana hosted a seminar with Togo, Benin,
and Nigeria "designed to promote close fraternal links with Ghana's immediate neighbors
in particular and member states of ECOWAS in general." 106 This seminar was conveyed
pursuant to the 1984 Quadripartite Agreements between these four countries. According
to Dr. Obed Asamoah, Ghana's Foreign Minister, the Agreements were "born out of a
mutual desire of the four contracting states to collectively seek ways and means of
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promoting peace, security and stability within the sub-region ... And to encourage efforts
at regional development." 107 Why were Burkina Faso and Cote d'lvoire, Ghana's
immediate northern and eastern neighbors, who are equally members of the ECOWAS
fraternity, neither part of the Quadripartite nor the Accra seminar? In the same manner
that the crucial business of sub-regional regime alliances and concerns of mutual security
was being couched in the rhetoric of fraternity, so did the promoters ofECOMOG seek to
legitimize their intervention on the basis of fraternity and humanitarian concerns.
Taylor himself was former member and insider of the Doe dictatorship. He may
have known better than to seek support from Nigeria, given the well-known friendship
between Presidents Doe and Babangida. 108 However, the political dynamics of Africa are
varied enough to create both friends and foes in one environment. Across Liberia's
western border was the octogenarian of African politics, President Houphouet Boigny of
Cote d'lvoire. He was acknowledged by both his enemies and admirers as an African
statesman and politician of distinguished credentials, a qualification which earned him
among his colleagues the title of "doyen" of African politics. By courtesy of French
paternalism and a Machiavellian political orientation, President Houphouet Boigny
maintained the one party rule of his Parti Democratique de Cote d'lvoire (PDCI-
Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire ). 109 Houphouet is said to have disliked his
comparatively "boyish" neighbor, President Doe, for a myriad of understandable reasons.
a. Houphouet Boigny and Doe
The most obvious was that the "vieux" or "sage" (old man), as Houphouet
preferred to be called, was an ally of both Liberian Presidents Taubman and Tolbert. In
the sharply divided terrain of post-independence African politics, Houphouet-Boigny
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, the Civil Defense Committee (a paramilitary
organization set up by the PNDC, which is now defunct under the 1992 Constitution), etc.
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shared Tubman's and Tolbert's views of Pan-Africanism, capitalism and relations with
the West. Eventually, highly personalized links between Houphouet and Tolbert were
forged with the marriage of the Liberian President's son , A. B. Tolbert to the niece
(ward) of Houphouet Boigny. A joint Liberian -Ivorian commission on cooperation was
established under Tolbert"
Even though there is some evidence of disagreement between Cote
d'lvoire and Liberia over access to America's coffee market, there is no suggestion
anywhere that this affected the friendship between the two leaders. Consequently, Doe,
who overthrew and executed Tolbert on the beaches of Monrovia in the full blitz of
television cameras during the 1 980 coup that brought him to power, could not have been
a welcome neighbor. 111
Doe's bloody revolt against President Tolbert also represented an
unpleasant reminder of what could befall these other leaders if their draconian domestic
security apparatus were ever to fail. There could not be a more unwelcome precedent than
Doe's PRC. Thus even though Houphouet Boigny may have learned to tolerate Doe, at
least at a diplomatic level, the latter may have still remained an inherently unwelcome
neighbor. This is due largely to the fact that the mixed nature of populations within the
sub-region coupled with porous borders makes cross-border insurgencies and dissident
activities a familiar occurrence.
Consequently, African regimes have a strong desire to be surrounded by
friendly regimes which can be trusted not to harbor fleeing dissidents and political
opponents. Throughout Africa, the existence of porous and arbitrary colonial borders
have often led to a regular occurrence of cross-border incursions by dissident factions and
rebel groups. The prevalence of loose borders and the national security problems they
pose are compounded by the preponderance of weak states across the sub-region, most of
which are barely capable of exerting a monopoly over force beyond their capitals and
110 Liebenow, Liberia: The Questfor Democracy, p. 146.
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alludes to Bryon Tarr, "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective," Journal of
Opinion, Issue 21, 1993, p.80.
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major cities. This explains why most of the major rebel activities and successes were
characterized by cross-border insurrections coupled with sustained covert and sometimes
overt support by neighboring regimes.
For example, General Quiwonkpa's momentarily successful coup against
Doe in November 1985 was launched from neighboring Sierra Leone and Cote d'lvoire.
According to Liebenow, "... General Quiwonkpa's forces were correctly perceived as
having come from Sierra Leone where they had been recruited and trained It was
also charged that the Ivory Coast had been a source of rebels." 112 Similarly, it is
significant to note that the rebel victories in the Chadian Civil War, the anarchy in the
Lake Regions (Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire), and lately the Congo highlight the
extent of this vulnerability.
To the extent that ECOMOG was an attempt to establish some kind of a
rudimentary, regulated, and institutional framework that would enable ECOWAS states
to balance against perceived threats to their regional stability and security, it was a
credible strategic initiative. The alternative may have been the usual recourse to largely
covert tactics of self-help, such as the bandwagoning already exemplified by the roles of
Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso. A classical example of this trend is what occurred in the
Great Lake regions of East Africa and Southern Africa.
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VI. REGIME LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY
AS A MOTIVE FOR INTERVENTION
The Liberian Civil War was crucial to the political stability of the West African
sub-region and for that matter the stability of some of its regimes. This may be due to the
more direct and inextricable link between political conflict, refugees and regional
stability. The civil war per se was a potential threat to regional peace and stability
because of its potential to spread beyond Liberia's borders. The prospect of a spillover of
the violence was enhanced by the prevalence of fundamentally permissive conditions
within the sub-region.
The peculiar circumstances ofECOMOG states imposed on some regional leaders
more pressing strategic issues. A close reading of most of the things that have been said,
written, and or done by West African leaders and policy makers are replete with clues and
pointers to the strategic and more important preoccupation of ECOMOG. Their primary
concern was the probable implications of the Liberian saga for their own political
stability and the legitimacy of their regimes. The report of the SMC on the crisis
acknowledges that the Liberian conflict had gone out of control and the violence led to a
distressing and unnecessary loss of innocent lives and property. The government in
Monrovia was no longer able to guarantee the security of Liberia's citizens and foreign
nationals, including hundreds of thousands of ECOWAS citizens. Also, the stability of
neighboring states was under threat as a result of the swarms of refugees fleeing the
fighting. The journal West Africa reported President Babangida as explaining that "what
probably motivated us was that we said at the last meeting we had at the ECOWAS
Summit of May in Banjul, there was a government that had lost its credibility to govern
and we had some warring factions that held the nation, the society and the people
hostage. There was virtually a breakdown of everything in Liberia." 113
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Over the years, African leaders have either bought off internal opposition or
compelled compliance by resorting to the repressive and authoritarian use of the coercive
apparatus of the state against all pockets of dissent and opposition. In addition, potential
sources of instability (actual or imagined) are eliminated by draconian internal security
measures. These tended to operate in such a swift fashion that it was becoming
increasingly impossible to orchestrate subversions or coups internally without being
tracked down.
Consequently, externally orchestrated insurgencies or insurrections have lately
become the only viable option for groups contemplating armed confrontation. In such a
security context, the principal actors in ECOMOG could not have been neutral,
disinterested humanitarianist as the rhetoric of regional leaders has maintained.
Therefore, the extent to which anarchy was prevailing in Liberia was a legitimate source
of anxiety, especially for regimes which thrived under a shadow of questionable
legitimacy and fermenting instability.
A. SOURCES OF ILLEGITIMACY AND STABILITY CONCERNS
The fact that the real motivations for ECOMOG were the concerns of regional
leaders for their own stability and the legitimacy of their regimes is demonstrated by the
fact that Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'lvoire were invited to participate in ECOMOG
because, according to the SMC, "as neighboring countries they bore the brunt of the
outflow of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Liberia." 114 While Guinea and Sierra
Leone availed themselves of this invitation, Cote d'lvoire declined. These different
responses by geographically contiguous states reflects the political features of the sub-
region and the national security postures of member states as I described.
The selective invitation merely reflects my theoretical contention that the alliance
response or behavior of states is often a function of the threat perception, which in turn
derives from a state's proximity to the threat. Consequently, alliance cohesion is likely to
be stronger among states that are mutually proximate to the threat than those who
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perceive themselves as far away from the consequence range. If the issue was fraternity
or humanitarianism, all West African states would be equally eligible.
Being Liberia's immediate neighbors, these states fall into the category of direct
proximity and as such, unless they are otherwise secured, they would be the most
concerned about the destabilizing consequences. Such states are therefore more likely to
be disposed to intervening to influence trends within Liberia so as to ensure that the
developments inside Liberia would not become hostile to themselves. I suggest this is
premised on naked self- interest of the states concerned.
This explanation by the SMC suggests the proposition that alliance motivation is
a function of a particular state's refugee burden. Even if the most important concern of
West African leaders was refugees, it is still plausible to contend that such a concern
would be still motivated by calculations of their own national interests than a concern for
refugees as such. Consequently, when there are more important and overriding strategic
interests, a country's concern may not necessarily be reflected by its refugee burden.
The central strategic question seems to be whether or not a particular
developments or sets of developments (which may or may not generate refugees)
constitutes in its totality a threat to the political stability, security, and legitimacy of the
regimes concerned. This is because threats of this nature are more fundamental since they
raise issues of regime survival, or preservation, etc. This is the justification or explanation
for the enthusiasm of countries such as Gambia, Nigeria, and Ghana who, even though
remotely contiguous to Liberia (physically or geographically), were as committed to
ECOMOG as Guinea, and Sierra Leone. Similarly, Cote d'lvoire was committed to
Liberia, but in a manner compatible with its own national interest and security
calculations.
Further, the response of some of Liberia's immediate neighbors themselves seems
to show that the strategic behavior of African regimes, especially in the realm of national
security, legitimacy and regime preservation, involves many more variables than the
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express claims of the SMC suggests. Some reports estimated the influx of refugees into
Guinea at 250,000, Cote d'lvoire at 120,000 and Sierra Leone at 30,000.' 15
1. Sierra Leone: Momoh's Legitimacy and Security Crises
Contrary to the logic of ECOMOG's refugees burden argument, Sierra Leone
joined the intervention to enforce peace in Liberia even though it suffered fewer refugees
as compared with Cote d'lvoire. On the other hand, Cote d'lvoire, which was presumably
suffering a greater refugee burden, was opposed to intervention. In fact, Cote d'lvoire
sought to undermine the intervention by providing support for the NPFL and using its
leverage to undermine regional cohesion and international support for ECOMOG.
Beyond numbers of refugees and pretenses to sub-regional fraternity and
humanitarianism, Momoh could see the "fire next door" as a prophecy of the "coming
anarchy" and consequently the need to consolidate the survival of his own regime.
Joining ECOMOG offered him the opportunity to intervene and preempt the Liberian war
from becoming an instability multiplier within the sub-region.
The threat perception of some West African leaders was more a question of what
similarities a particular sub-regional government shared with the Doe dictatorship so as to
force a perception that the challenge to Doe was indirect in terms of a precedent of what
could happen to others. If the answer was in the affirmative, then what antidotes would a
particular regime have in the event of a threatening instability? In the first regard, there is
generally no difference between sub-regional states, since they are mostly one species of
dictatorship or another. Momoh's real motivation is illustrated by the fact that while
intervening in Liberia militarily, he also commenced the most rigorous political reform in
Sierra Leone in nearly 30 year of dictatorship. 116 As an Anglophone in the post-Cold War
era, Sierra Leone had no external guarantee of its political stability and regime
legitimacy. Momoh had to deal with his own instabilities, and consequently ECOMOG
offered a new collective arrangement within which he could accomplish regime survival.
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There were also too many similarities between the political dynamics of Momoh's
hegemony in Sierra Leone and the Doe regime, such that Momoh could not afford to be
indifferent about the internal developments within Liberia (whether or not there were
refugees as a consequence). This is the sense in which ECOMOG was a rescue boat
which some countries could not afford to miss, which led to the degree of unprecedented
commitment and alliance cohesion from Sierra Leone. Steven Riley reflects these
similarities as follows,
...Both states were poorly governed, with economies in steady decline.
Despite human rights abuses and gross corruption, they were most
peaceful. Their shaky systems of rule were backed up by small privilege
standing armies and police forces. It was assumed that any threat to the
established regimes had been bought off by patronage in Sierra Leone or
crushed by Liberia's more repressive regime. 117
Indeed, Captain Valentine Strasser, who overthrew Momoh's hegemony was
himself an ECOMOG veteran. It is alleged among other things that after witnessing the
deterioration of Liberia into anarchy, Strasser and his fellow ECOMOG veterans could
not afford to see Momoh's regime drive Sierra Leone down the same path of chaos. This
is arguably another variant of the precedent value of the Liberian conflict that ECOMOG
was intended to preempt.
It is significant to note that like most coups in Africa, Strasser's was greeted with
popular approval, the usual pointer to the deceptive and state managed pretenses that
African dictators make to legitimacy. But even after his coup, Strasser's juvenile and
populist junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council of Sierra Leone (NPRC), had to
contend with a revamped Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the waiting.
Even though the RUF, led by a former Sierra Leonean army photographer turned
dissident, Foday Sankoh, predated the NPFL, there is no doubt that the former owed its
new lease on life to Charles Taylor. Sankoh is said to bear a grudge against the Sierra
Leonean government which imprisoned him for his alleged involvement in a failed coup
d'etat against Siaka Stephens' one party regime in 1969. Consequently, he formed the
1 l7Steven P. Riley, Liberia and Sierra Leone Anarchy and Peace in West Africa? London:
Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1996, p.l.
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RUF which, until its complicity with the NPFL, waged a sporadic and feeble guerrilla
war in Sierra Leone's diamond and mineral rich rural hinterland. 118
Paul Richards argues that it was in Taylor's strategic interest to help the RUF
escalate its revolutionary campaign in the Eastern region of Sierra Leone in March 1991.
I argue further that within Sierra Leone the conditions for instability and the questions of
legitimacy were already permissive, at least potentially. This is largely due to the fact that
Sierra Leone, like Liberia or any other West African state, is potentially rich with
agriculture and mineral resources. 119 However, most of Sierra Leone's wealth was
consumed by the urban-based political elite through extensive corruption, waste and
patronage. The result is a dispossessed, resentful and alienated rural population who are
eager recruits for a reinvigorated RUF. Characteristic of weak, unstable and illegitimate
regimes, the ARFC as well as Momoh's dictatorship, were fast losing ground to a virtual
NPFL plus RUF offensive.
According to Robert Mortimer, Taylor was seeking to punish Sierra Leone for its
role in ECOMOG. The NPFL also wanted to undermine the alliance by creating domestic
instabilities to keep the Sierra Leonean regime busy on its home turf. 120 He also argues
that the NPFL offensive into Sierra Leone was to enable Taylor to crack down on pro-
Doe soldiers who had fled across the border into Sierra Leone after the death of Doe. 121
Significantly, this is evidence of the mutual or collective vulnerability of West African
states and the underlying motivation for joining ECOMOG as a collective insurance
against instabilities and legitimacy challenges.
B. NIGERIA: A LEGEND OF INSTABILITY AND ILLEGITIMACY
The feature of unstable and illegitimate dictatorships, at least at the time the
decision to deploy ECOMOG was made, is fashionable among West African states. This
creates profound similarities in the political dynamics and "fortunes" of sub-regional
118Paul Richards, "Rebellion in Sierra Leone and Liberia: A Crises of Youth," in O. Farley, ed.,
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regimes. These common dynamics in the context of changing global security
arrangements united them to form ECOMOG against what they perceived as a mutual
threat to the legitimacy and stability.
1. Classic Praetoi ianism and Corruption
In thirty-seven years since independence in 1960, Nigeria's notoriety for unstable,
corrupt, and illegitimate regimes is legend. Of the nine republics that Nigeria has
celebrated, only two were civilian regimes, each of which ruled for very short periods.
The army has directly ruled the country for more than 25 of its 35 years of independence
and exerted powerful influence over policy making, even during the brief spells of
civilian government. There have been seven successful military coups and countless
failed ones.
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Nigeria's immense human wealth and natural resources potential, which was
enhanced by the discovery of crude oil, seems to have helped cultivate commensurate
greed, corruption, and incompetence, especially among the country's political elite.
Generally, military as well as civilian political elite have proved to be massively corrupt,
unaccountable, and ineffective. Much of Nigeria's oil money was squandered on ill-
suited projects or was stolen by corrupt officials, their patrons, cronies and families. 123
As in most of Africa, political power and wealth have become coterminous;
whoever controls the state controls everything. Political influence is not only one means
of enriching one's self, family and friends, it is the only way. 124 The plunder of the public
resources by politicians and their cronies defies every sense of the concept of public
service, public good, and accountability.
One of the high points of Nigeria's classical military hegemony has been the
Babangida and Abacha eras. These regimes masterminded and sustained ECOMOG
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respectively. This period witnessed the emergence of "an organizational pattern in which
corrupt senior military godfathers built and used networks of lower ranking clients." 125
Consequently, "junior officers without a patron were unhappy with the system, but this
was often due less to commitment to the national interest than personal jealousy and
resentment of their exclusion." 126 While Nigeria's military and political elite are multi-
millionaires, lower ranks are the victims of the harsh realties of the country's economic
downturn and institutionalized plundering of state resources.
Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, argue that "Throughout Africa, statist
economic policies, weak political institutions, and an internally fractured army composed
of personal loyalty pyramids have led to military coups." 127 Further, I argue that Africa's
entire population and civil society is characterized by structural deficiencies through the
divide-and-rule tactics of colonial rule which post-independence African elite continue to
exploit. In so doing, Africa's elite have never taken seriously the more arduous but
indispensable task of engineering integration and national identity. On the contrary, both
civilian and military politicians have tended unduly and negatively to exploit tribal,
ethnic and cultural differences of traditional societies. Consequently Africa's diversity,
strength and resourcefulness, is being made an obstacle to stability.
In terms of the absence of a political culture, institutional framework and attitudes
to mitigate the conflict inducing potential of divisive, corrupt and exclusionary political
practices, Nigeria is probably the most deficient country in Sub-Saharan Africa. As such,
in spite of its experience of a bitter civil war, Nigeria's political elite, seem intent on
pushing Sub-Saharan Africa's most populous and richest state to the brink of self-
destruction rather than integration of its society.
As early as 1962, Henry Bretton sounded warnings of pessimism even as the
structural, institutional and other frameworks of an independent Nigeria was being put
124Larry Diamond, "Nigeria's Perennial Struggle," Journal ofDemocracy, Vol. 2, No. 4, Fall
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together. He projected that given Nigeria's colonial institutional structures and divisions,
there would be intensified internal pressures in relation to the struggle for power and for
the rights and privileges associated with the positions of power and influence. Further, he
argues that "because conditions are likely to become a permanent feature of Nigerian
politics for the foreseeable future, it is of course to be expected that forces and factors
tending to create, or work towards the creation of political instability will outweigh for
some time to come, the stabilizing factors." 128
2. Diversity: A Strength or Weakness?
Nigeria's inherent instability has its roots in the pre-colonial social, political and
economic structures and institutions, which were only reinforced and exacerbated during
colonial rule to facilitate the exploitative objectives of British imperial policy. Through
deliberate colonial expediencies, the existing divisions between the ethnically, politically,
socially, culturally and linguistically distinct societies of present day Nigeria were pushed
beyond limits of integration. By the end of the British conquest in 1903, when it
amalgamated Northern and Southern Nigeria into the colony and protectorate of Nigeria
in 1914, the territory was composed of about 250 to 400 ethnic groups (depending on
how counting is done) of widely varied cultures and modes of political organizations. 129
The most outstanding features of modern society reflect the influence of regionally
dominant ethnic groups such as the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West,
and the Igbo in the East.
The political, social, and cultural power structure of Northern Nigeria bears a
mark of decisive influence of Islamic civilization. Before British colonial intrusion, there
had developed quasi-oriental systems of despotism reminiscent of the great Sudanese
empires. These systems showed sufficient social and political cohesiveness to ward off
excessive European intervention in native affairs. The social discipline derived from
I28Henry L. Bretton, Power and Stability in Nigeria, The Politics ofDecolonization, New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962, p. 5.
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Islam produced adequate stability and seemed to provide a more effective means of law
enforcement and general administration than direct British intervention could have
achieved at the time. 130 Indeed, Lord Harley observes that the larger political units in the
north featured a well organized fiscal system, a definitive code of land tenure, a regular
scheme of local rule, through appointment of local heads, and a trained judiciary
administering the tenets of Muhammadan Law. 131 Without significant modifications, the
British merely acquiesced in the continuation of this feudal structure and thus made it an
integral part of imperial rule which was dubiously called "indirect rule."
Southern Nigeria, due to a different set of social and physical factors, produced
varying power structures and diverse political processes and customs. The dense tropical
forest and the tsetse fly, among other factors, appear to have served as a barrier to the
southward march of Islam, at least for a time. Insulated from aggressive Islamic and other
influences by its physical environment, southern society evolved into well organized and
effective political units especially in the western region among the Yoruba and Edo. 132
Another impact of these geographic and social factors was the teeming urban
concentration of people which resulted in political configurations. Murdock reports that
states of considerable magnitude occur among the Edo, Igala, Igbir, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Nupe
and all tribes of the Yoruba cluster, but elsewhere, political integration does not transcend
the level of local community. 133 Following European contact, these southern sections
were intensively subjected to a process of acculturation primarily through missionary and
trading interactions. On the whole, tendencies towards the development of indigenous
social and political stability were counteracted by agencies associated with colonial
exploitation. British imperial policy was to make the power structure pliable to colonial
intrusion and exploitation. 134
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The Eastern Regions experienced greater social fracturing than the North and
South. This was also mainly due to geographical factors. The dense forest discouraged
centralization and consequently led to the virtual absence of centralized indigenous
political and administrative structures or empires comparable to the north or to relatively
cohesive and large scale organizations as Yoruba and Edo in the west.
It is important to note that post-independence Nigeria inherited these clearly
distinguishable ethnic groups which had been further isolated by discriminating and
divide and rule colonial practices. The major ethnic or regional divisions included the
dominant Northern Hausa Fulani, the eastern Egbo and the western Yoruba. These
distinct ethnic, cultural and linguistic configurations were encouraged with each
maintaining its dominance in its respective region of the country. The potential problems
that arise among groups whose differences were deliberately reinforced by colonial divide
and rule policies is the prevalence of traditional stereotypes and affinities which often
transcend a national loyalties.
3. Impact of Colonial Divide-and Rule
Colonial rule, far from adopting policies that would obliterate ethnic differences
and integrate Nigerian society, tended to undermine and inhibit integration. During the
prelude to Nigeria's independence, a fatal attempt was made in an attempt to reorganize
traditional units into local government wards and parliamentary constituencies. This
reinforced the role of traditional political and social structures in the politics of the
modern state and put these traditional institutions at the center of local level political
party rivalries.
Consequently, the struggle for political power between competing individuals and
groups invariably fractured along these ethnic, tribal, cultural, and ultimately regional
cleavages and animosities. Even more crucial to the struggle for power and control was
the fact that given a colonial economy which was dominated by the imperial
administration, Nigeria's political elite merely entrenched the state control of the
economy.
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The process of the consolidation of these inherently decisive political structures
and cultures is reflected by the split between the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and
Nnamdi Azikiwe's National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the early 1940's
along the ethnic division between the Yorubas and Igbos. Similarly, the Action Group
(AG) was an offshoot of the political wing of the cultural associations of the Yoruba
educated elite, the Egbe Omo Oduwa. The NCNC was closely allied with the Igbo State
Union, while the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was the platform of the Fulani
aristocracy. In the smaller ethnic groups there was a proliferation of political parties, each
of which was indistinguishable from a particular ethnic or tribal cultural association. 135
Nigeria's political elite mastered the politics of reward for loyalty, versus punishment for
disloyalty. This caused regional and ethnic animosities, and hostilities as a ready recipe
for politicians inclined to capitalize on divisive or ethnic issues in order to exploit
political advantage. As in most parts of West Africa, political debate then degenerated
from policy issues to a game of chess on ethnic sensitivities and grievances. 136
Nigeria drifted into instability and ethnic tensions at the very dawn of
independence. Shortly after independence in 1 960, ethnically motivated political violence
flared across the country culminating in the bloody Biafran war between the Eastern Igbo,
who sought to secede and the Federal Military Government (FMG) , dominated mainly
by the Northern Hausa Fulani. 137
Overall, the Nigerian military became the worst victim of ethnic manipulations,
animosities, and mutual suspicions of regional domination. Northern Nigerians,
especially the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy have always been apprehensive of domination by
the southerners, especially the Igbo, and lately the Yoruba. Consequently, ethnic rivalry
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and often conflict has been the preeminent political problem for Nigeria during its entire
1 ^ w
existence.
4. A Lagging Timebomb?
The Constitutional introduction of a two party system in Nigeria's 1992 elections
was ostensibly an effort by the Babangida regime to mitigate the institutionalized
corruption that plagued Nigeria. However, it is needless to say that if the government
were serious about addressing corruption there was much begging to done. The outcome
of the election was annulled by the military, even though acclaimed by many observers as
the fairest in Nigeria's history. 139 Significantly, one school of thought has it that the
internationally denounced annulment was provoked by Hausa-Fulani concerns that the
election of Mashood Abiola, a Moslem but Yoruba, would end northern domination of
Nigerian politics. Others argue that the annulment was fueled by pressures from the
military elite concerned about the end of the opportunity to accumulate wealth and
control power. Either way, these are clear pointers to the deep-seated instability and the
legitimacy crisis of the Nigerian regime.
Further, there is widespread awareness among Nigerians of growing ethnic
conflicts and heightened schisms within the military. Currently, while the majority of the
army's officers are southern belt Christians, the military has long been dominated by
northern Moslems. This continues to be a subtle source of deep resentment by non-
northern officers and civilian elite. 140
Another dimension to the religious flavor of Nigerian Politics and security is that
in addition to the ethnic tensions within Nigeria's most sensitive state institutions
(military and federal bureaucracy), there is a growing religious (Christian and Islamic)
fundamentalism. This disturbing trend may have been aggravated by President
Babangida's decision in 1986 surreptitiously to seek full membership for Nigeria in the
138
Butts and Metz, Armies and Democracy in the New Africa, p. 5.
139
Larry Diamond, "Nigeria's Search for a New Political Order," Journal ofDemocracy, vol. 2,
no. 2, Spring 1991, p. 56.
140
Butts and Metz,, Armies and Democracy in the New Africa, p. 8.
73
Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC). The propensity of the policy choices or
political manipulations to ignite subsisting and potentially explosive ethnic and religious
animosities was exemplified by the wave of conflict and tension that flared across the
north and the middle regions of Nigeria. Yet, sporadic religious violence with inevitable
ethnic undertones has claimed more than 5,000 lives between 1990 and 1994, with 1,000
killed in April 1991 alone during riots in Buachi and Kaduna. 141
Without any risk of exaggeration, one can legitimately argue that across the West
African sub-region there are manifestations of similarly deficient state structures, political
dynamics, patterns, attitudes and elite political culture which are at best recipes for
political instability and anarchy. Regimes that are at the brink of explosion, such as the
Nigerian dictatorship, are thus sensitive to all tendencies towards instability and
legitimacy challenges both at home and within its sphere of influence. This is particularly
so because of the tendency of these instabilities toward cross border escalation, etc.
Consequently, the rebel challenge in Liberia, the subsequent deterioration of the war
along ethnic lines and intelligence of sub-regional dissident involvement with the NPFL
was perceived by West African states with similar potential as an indirect threat to their
own regime survival and legitimacy.
C. GHANA: IS THERE REALLY A DIFFERENCE?
One of the cardinal principles of Ghana's foreign policy since independence has
been the fostering of the closest possible cooperation with neighboring countries with
whom the people of Ghana share cultural history, ties of blood and economics. 142
Notwithstanding such grandiose foreign policy proclamations, the dynamics of West
African politics, the imperatives of national security and regime survival have left the
relations between Ghana and its immediate neighbors ambivalent at best, and, more often
than not, hostile.
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Following the Rawlings coup in 1979 and subsequent revolution in 1981,
apprehensions of the precedent value of the changes in Ghana's domestic affairs pushed
its relations with its neighbors on edge. 143 It is said that " a consistent preoccupation of
Ghana, Togo and Cote dTvoire is that of national security. The Provisional National
Defense Council (PNDC) regime repeatedly accused Togo and Cote dTvoire of harboring
armed Ghanaian dissidents who planned to overthrow or destabilize the PNDC." 144
Similarly, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo has repeatedly accused Ghana of
complicity to destabilize his regime. 145
This custom of accusations and counter accusations of covert instabilities has
characterized relations between Ghana and Cote dTvoire. Both countries have traded
accusations of masterminding insurgencies and coups, granting asylum to dissidents and
exiles fleeing their respective regimes and conniving armed sabotage by these groups. 146 1
argue that these features of mutual suspicion and vulnerability tend to characterize
relations between most Community states. These sometimes lead to heightened tensions,
especially when the neighboring regimes are not friendly. Consequently, short of open
interference, the demands of self interest, national security, regime stability and
legitimacy make West African regimes virtual interested parties in the internal political
and security dynamics of their neighbors.
Ghana seems to share to a certain extent some of the vulnerabilities of its West
African neighbors. Some recent trends indicate that there may be prevalent, even if
subtle, ethnic or tribal rivalries and animosities in national politics. Even though it has
been strongly disputed by the government, there have been widespread allegations of
selective and discriminatory political and economic practices against the Rawlings
regime. The best jobs and most of the lucrative government contracts are said to go to
Ewes, members of President Rawling's tribe. The Rawlings regime is believed to have










tribe, who are thought to perceive themselves to be the most industrious, enlightened and
eligible group for political and economic hegemony in Ghana. The interesting contrast in
this debate is that while President Rawlings has constantly asserted his disposition to call
any honest and competent Ghanaian to public service, his critics maintain that his attitude
is the precise opposite.
Nevertheless, the Rawlings regime has made commendable progress in making a
transition from a populist dictatorship to democratic rule. However, it is significant to
note that much of this political progress seemed to pivot around the "charismatic"
personality of Rawlings rather than on sound institutional engineering and the
development of the necessary democratic culture of negotiation, compromise, and mutual
coexistence of political interest groups. In my opinion, the considerable gains made under
the Rawlings hegemony stand to be consolidated if Rawlings himself would adopt a
tendency towards de-emphasizing what is essentially a personality cult evolved around
his person. In any case, the real test of Ghana's stability and regime legitimacy will come
in the year 2000, when President Rawlings becomes constitutionally precluded from
seeking reelection
.
There is also resentment, especially in Ghanaian opposition quarters, that the
Rawlings regime has over the years discreetly dominated the military with the President's
tribesmen, the Ewes. Another respect in which Rawlings is accused of attempting to
manipulate the loyalty of national security agencies to himself is in the "wholesale"
absorption of erstwhile members of his partisan grassroots revolutionary cadres" into the
security agencies. While the government contends that members of certain ethnic groups
such as the Ashantis are not oriented towards the military or are usually otherwise
unqualified, there is considerable concern that the government may be conniving a
deliberate policy of exclusion. There have been concerns of subtle attempts to victimize
and marginalize persons of northern extraction following divisions between Rawlings and
some of his former revolutionary allies of northern dissent.
However, recent trends show that the government has adopted a policy of working
towards restoring a reasonable and practically feasible ethnic balance and national
representation in key institutions of state. However, there may already be structural
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inequalities on the ground (ethnic imbalances) which often tend to undermine
government policy from materializing at the levels of implementation. If this tendency to
ethnic discrimination materializes, the current concerns about ethnic or tribal imbalances
within the military as well as other security agencies could become a source of political
instability at one point or the other.
D. THE ETHNIC OR TRIBAL DIMENSION OF CIVIL WAR: POTENTIAL
SPREAD
I have argued that there are profound ethnic overlaps and fraternities which cut
across indiscriminate colonial national boundaries. This fact invariably connects
societies, cultures, tribes, clans, and in some cases families across national borders. As a
result, legal nationals of one country more often than not tend to share in all the
sensitivities, political concerns and interests of members of their ethnic groups and
relatives who are nevertheless nationals of neighboring countries.
The Ewes and Akans in Ghana overlap into Togo as well as Cote dTvoire. It is
reported that in Cote dTvoire, as across most of Africa, national boundaries reflect the
impact of colonial rule as much as present day political reality bringing nationalism into
conflict with centuries of evolving ethnic identification. Each of Cote dTvoire's large
cultural groupings has more members outside its national boundaries than within. As a
result, many Ivorian have strong social and cultural ties with people of the neighboring
countries. These centrifugal pressures provided a challenge to political leaders in the
1980s as they did to the governors of the former French colony. 147
This is a standard analysis that holds true for all of the continent of Africa, and in
particular, the West African sub-region. The tribal or ethnic overlaps across national
boundaries and nationalities is illustrated by the fact that the Akans, who are predominant
in Southern Ghana, also make up about 18% of the population in Cote dTvoire. They
constitute communities in Togo as well. Similarly, the Mende, who form about 17% of
the population in Cote dTvoire according to a 1980 estimate, also occupied territory in
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Guinea and Mali, and the Krahns of Liberia, President Doe's tribe, also overlap into Cote
d'lvoire. Indeed, one of the principal causes of animosity against the Doe regime was the
efforts that Doe is alleged to have made over the years to ensure the domination of the
AFL by members of his Krahn ethnic group by pursuing a scheme of recruiting Krahns
from neighboring Cote d'lvoire. 148
According to Liebenow, only a few of Liberia's ethnic groups are found entirely
within Liberia's borders. The majority of its approximately 16 tribes straddle the borders
between Liberia and the neighboring states, especially Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote
d'lvoire. In some cases, such as the Mende, to whom I have already referred, the majority
of the group resides across the border in Sierra Leone. Also, some of Liberia's tribes,
such as the Vai, Mandingo, and the Kpelle, who form the majority ethnic group reside on
both sides of Liberia's north-western border with Guinea. 149
Further, the Fullah in Sierra Leone belong to large ethnic groups spread
throughout much of West Africa, from Senegal to Lake Chad. They are said to be
pastoralists who encroached Sierra Leone from the Fouta Djalon region of Guinea
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Consequently, even today, the Fullah of
Sierra Leone still look to the Futa Djalon mountains as their traditional home.
There are records of inter-ethnic rifts mainly between the Creoles of Sierra Leone
and the peoples of the interior. While the former are mainly urban dwellers who regard
themselves as the agents of European civilization, the latter deeply resented what they
saw as a condescending and contemptuous Creole behavior. Groups such as the Susu,
Vai, and Kissi, whose major distribution is in neighboring countries, are not very
significant numerically, while the dominant groups-the Temme, Mende, and Limba- are
mainly concentrated in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the problem of ethnic loyalties across
national boundaries is arguably inconsequential. Even though initial inter ethnic rivalries
147 Robert Handloff, Cote d'lvoire, Country Study, Washington: Government Printing Office, 3 rd
edition, 1991, p. 49.
148
"The Fall of Doe," West Africa, 17-23 September, 1990, p. 2468.
149
Irving Kaplan, Area Handbookfor Sierra Leone, Washington: Government Printing Office,
1923, p. 65. Also see Liebenow, Liberia: The Questfor Democracy, p. 35.
78
and competition filtered into political party formation, political competition soon became
a North-South issue. 150
Although inter-ethnic relations in Sierra Leone are enhanced by urbanization, the
rapid emergence of a political culture of greed, corruption and mismanagement have
generated some animosities against the Creoles. For example, they are perceived as a
privileged group with access to jobs, wealth, education, etc. These trends are very similar
to those of the Americo-Liberian hegemony, which as I have argued, created the
circumstances that brought Doe to power and essentially sowed the seeds of Liberia's
war. Besides, the speedy support galvanized by the RUF against the government in
Freetown seem to suggest that there may have been prevalent underlying resentment by
the dispossessed and disillusioned rural Sierra Leonean population against the privileged
urban dwellers who are mainly Creoles.
The very nature of population distribution vis-a-vis ethnic or tribal affinities
creates a potential vulnerability for the spread of ethnic conflict. Generally conflict may
be exported across borders by rebels, insurgents or dissidents who seek sanctuaries in
neighboring countries. Almost invariably, sub-regional refugees have family members,
relatives and sometimes whole tribes, and societies who identify with the political
grievance of the exiles. These ethnic, tribal or family connections and affinities across
national boundaries tend to foster the existence of rebel bases in neighboring countries.
E. THE DISSIDENT FACTOR
These pockets of dissident havens across West Africa are a constant source of
instability to sub regional regimes. Consequently, the threat by dissidents or exiles rates
very high national security priorities of West African governments and strongly
influences both foreign and national security policy. Another reason for why the
incidence of dissidents is perceived as a significant threat is the familiar tendency of




dissidents who are challenging or attempting to weaken their rivals. The examples of
Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire speak to this reality.
The creation of refugees and small markets for free arms trafficking as well as the
mere precedent value of war tends to promote the spread of ethnic conflict. Sometimes
rebels or dissidents prior to or during a conflict may perceive some tactical or strategic
gain that may be achieved by seizing territory or establishing bases across the country of
fighting in order to establish sanctuary or access to resources or even supply and
communication channels. For example, the NPFL initially established bases across
Liberia's border with Cote d'lvoire from where Charles Taylor commenced his campaign
to unseat Doe. These bases were crucial from a tactical and a strategic standpoint because
they facilitated supplies and communications from Libya through Burkina Faso and Cote
d'lvoire. Even though this helped Taylor's war effort, it was not without complications.
Specifically, this led to the air strikes of the Ivorian border town of Danane and other
bridges within Ivorian territory by ECOMOG bombers. Without more, these responses by
ECOMOG could have provoked a military confrontation involving Cote d'lvoire.
In another connection, NPFL rebels are reported to have invaded Sierra Leone,
thus exporting the war to that country. One plausible theory has been that the combined
NPFL-RUF offensive was calculated to otherwise engage Sierra Leonean government
troops at home and undermine their role in ECOMOG. Another school of thought has it
that the NPFL support to the RUF was intended to establish control over Sierra Leone's
mineral rich regions to enable Charles Taylor to plunder these minerals for his personal
enrichment as well as to finance his war effort. It is significant that whatever his motives,
Taylor's support has practically revitalized Foday Sankoh's RUF and has since plunged
Sierra Leone into a civil war that has proven intractable. Admittedly, it is the challenge
posed by the RUF to the government in Freetown that precipitated the overthrow of
Momoh by Strasser, and subsequently the overthrow of the newly elected civilian
government of president Ahmed Tijan Kabbah. Since then, a Nigerian-led "ECOMOG
force" is said to is said to be engaged in the exchange of hostilities with the junta of
Major Jonny Koramah supported by rebels of the RUF. The net effect of all this is that
the present instabilities in the Sierra Leone are a sequel to the Liberian civil war.
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The propensity of a conflict to spread is related to the fact that African and West
African governments have long mustered the practice of covert action insurgencies and
counterinsurgencies against what may be perceived as unfriendly neighboring regimes.
Sub-regional states often resort to the provision of sanctuary to dissidents and exiles and
occasionally lend direct military assistance. This may be resorted to in a bid to weaken or
completely destabilize unfavorable neighboring governments or regional rivals. This has
been the trend that characterized the dynamics of the conflict in East and Central Africa
as well as Liberia. As I tried to demonstrate, for a variety of reasons, Presidents
Houphouet Boigny and Campaore provided staging facilities as well as sanctuary to
enable Charles Taylor to launch his insurgency. While Compoare may have been fronting
as a pawn for Ghaddafi as well as seeking to please his "Godfather," President
Houphouet, the latter was himself motivated by a desire for revenge against Doe.
The state of uncontrolled activity that characterizes the borders of West African
states with their neighbors, especially when swamped by refugees, make feasible an easy
trade in weapons and other illegal products. This is due partly to the fact that most sub-
regional states are barely able to exert influence and control beyond urban centers and
more so police their borders. Consequently, such an availability of weapons coupled with
the porous borders and weak governments lacking decisive monopoly over the use of
force is a clear recipe for cross-border challenges, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies.
In addition, the free trade in weapons across most of Africa's borders is nourished by
generous Cold War supplies into some of the zones that are now caught in civil strife and
conflict. Consequently, the mere availability of weapons poses a threat to security and
stability, especially in the context of societies or countries with deep seated and
sometimes sharply divided social, cultural, economic, and political animosities.
Moreover, there is a major lack of consensus as to the legitimacy of the political system.
Stedman argues that conflicts in Africa have also spread across borders through
contagion or "demonstration effects". The prevalence of conflicts per se raise fears that
similar violence may erupt especially where the political elite tend to know that similar
provocation, permissive conditions and predisposition are widespread. However, they
also provide opportunities for leaders to respond to potential problems and possibly
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preempt an eventual escalation of conflict. Indeed, I will argue that ECOMOG was such a
preemptive measure and by so responding, West Africans have saved themselves even if
temporarily, another lake regions. While the argument that the precedent value of conflict
may fuel the spread across boundaries stands difficult to justify, the experience of
Africa's independence struggles, political protest, and the more recent conflicts in
Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Congo, etc., are all pointers to the fact that precedent may have
influenced the spread of these conflicts, even if only marginally. As a result, it is
plausible to say that an unimpeded NPFL rebel military success over Doe's AFL may
have concluded yet another cookbook for disgruntled political interest groups, exiles, and
dissidents within the West Africa sub-region. However, as a product of what I would
regard as strategic thinking, some West African leaders saw the writing on the wall and
appropriately were motivated to take the necessary preemptive measures by constituting
ECOMOG.
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VII. RATIONALE FOR RELIANCE ON ECOMOG
(A BOAT TO THE RESCUE)
ECOWAS did not express any strategic, military or security related goals
whatsoever until the signing of the ECOWAS Protocols on Non Aggression in 1978 and
the Protocol on Mutual Defense in 1981. Even then, it remained unclear as to whether or
not the Treaty on Mutual Defense contemplated the circumstances in which ECOMOG
was deployed. There is no unequivocal assertion that ECOMOG was deployed pursuant
to the Protocol on Mutual on Mutual Defense. Moreover, neither the SMC nor any of the
institutional mechanisms that have been resorted to bear any relationship with the
language or spirit of the protocol. The Authority of Heads of State and Government set up
the SMC during the ECOWAS Summit in May 1990. "Its mandate was broad and
general, namely to intervene presumably as a mediator whenever a conflict threatened the
stability of the West Africa region" 151 I argue that this was a crucial strategic move
necessary to overcome Africa's most significant colonial legacy and obstacle to regional
cooperation, the Francophone-Anglophone divide.
A. BRIDGING THE ANGLOPHONE-FRANCOPHONE DIVIDE
Francophone West African states differ considerably from their Anglophone or
Luciphone neighbors in their national security assessments and threat perceptions. The
general reason for this is the security "insurance" provided by Paris. The expediencies of
paternalistic French colonial and-post colonial policies have left a legacy of Francophone
African regimes which derive both national security and regime legitimacy more from
Paris than from their populations. Consequently, Francophone West African states can
more often than not afford to be indifferent about threatening developments in sub-
regional political dynamics. In practice, France's role as the central political and national
security play-maker is entrenched through economic and military cooperation.
151 Robert A. Mortimer, "ECOMOG, Liberia and Regional Security in West Africa," in Edmond
J. Keller and Donald Rothchild eds., Africa in the New International Order, Boulder: Lynne
Reinner Publishers, 1996, p. 151.
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An explicit and practical manifestation of this is the case of Senegal, which joined
an expanded ECOMOG only after extensive prodding, promises and guarantees of
logistics, funding etc. by the U.S., but pulled out under after suffering comparatively very
minor casualties. 152 To the extent that a state does not share in the threat perception of an
alliance, its commitment is likely to wane as a matter of time and with increasing costs,
casualties, etc.
1. La Communaute and Regional Security Cooperation
The earliest manifestations of the sub-regional security implications of the
Francophone-Anglophone emerged soon after the period of independence. The old
demons of the legacy of colonial rivalry intruded events during the Nigerian civil war. 153
Many officials in the region believed that France, acting through its most compliant post
independence proxy (President Houphouet Boigny of Cote dTvoire), was lending covert
support to the secessionists in Biafra who were at war against the Federal Military
Government ( FMG). Seventeen years later, the community is grappling with the
problems that ECOWAS was intended to help alleviate.
The Community is still haunted by the ghosts of the Anglophone-Francophone
colonial rivalries. Burkina Faso and Cote dTvoire, two Francophones, were to a greater
or lesser extent aligned with Charles Taylor's NPFL. They were aligned against a
predominantly Anglophone ECOMOG. Togo, a Francophone member of the SMC, which
had originally agreed to contribute troops to ECOMOG, reneged on its commitment
without stated reasons. 154 As if these trends were not conclusive enough, Senegal, which
initially would not send troops to Liberia, had ironically contributed a token force to the
Gulf War. President Campaore of Burkina Faso openly and consistently denounced
ECOMOG as illegal and unjust. Senegal's leftist opposition movement, the Senegalese
Democratic League (LSD), demanded the unconditional withdrawal of ECOMOG, which
152
Ibid., p. 155. As inducement for the Senegalese participation, the Pentagon gave Senegal $15
million worth of military equipment, paid a major part of operational costs, provided logistic
support and the U.S. promptly wrote off $45 million public debt.
153
"Dangers for ECOWAS," West Africa, 22-28 October 1990, p. 2689.
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it described as an unjustifiable intervention by ECOWAS into the internal affairs of
Liberia. The Senegalese Foreign Minister, Mr. Seydina Omar Sey, speaking to the
Senegalese daily Le Soleil newspaper, protested at the manner in which the decision to
deploy ECOMOG was reached, alleging that it set a dangerous precedent. 155 Guinea
supported ECOMOG and contributed troops on the invitation of the SMC. As the
traditional Francophone "prodigal son", however, Guinea consistently took an anti-
Francophone stance and therefore is the exception that proves the rule.
Another major factor that contributed to the state of paralysis of ECOWAS is
rooted in the fact that the Francophone commonwealth remains a permanent dividing
feature. With the singular exception of Guinea, the process of decolonization in
Francophone Africa was merely ceremonial. Arguably, it appears to have presented an
opportunity for France to reorient and better consolidate its strangle-hold over colonial
territories and hapless populations by setting up African front men to do France's work in
exchange for comprehensive patronage.
Sub-Saharan Africa seems to have presented a rare opportunity to France in its
scheme of global ambition. France's foray into Africa was dictated mainly by realpolitik
necessities within Europe; it had suffered a defeat by Prussia in 1 870, leaving it weaker
having forfeited Alsace. Meanwhile, France was mustering a growing industrial
capability, requiring raw materials and markets amidst apprehensions of British scramble
to exclusively annex the entire continent of Africa both as a source of raw materials and a
market for expanding industrial activity.
Francophone Africa became indispensable to France's ambition, designs, role and
recognition as a world power156 Consequently, the policy of assimilation, and
subsequently, "/' homme de Brazzaville" cooperation in 1943; hi cadre reforms in 1956;
and finally la communaute, or the Community, in 1958 were all logical policy
imperatives necessary to enable Paris to replace the shackles of colonialism with more
154
"Liberia: the Crises Deepens," West Africa, 3-9, September, 1990, p. 2389.
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"Senegal: Reservations About ECOMOG," West Africa, 10-16 September, 1990, p. 2455.
Also see Le Soleil, August 24, 1990.
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subtle, but still intrusive, and more binding chains of neocolonialism. The net effect of
this was an ingeniously crafted structure of post-colonial political, economic social and
cultural arrangements, which have left Francophone Africa in a vicious cycle of
dependency on France and consequently, incapable of independent subscription to
ECOWAS policies.
2. "Communaute Financiere Africaine" (CFA) Zone
Through the creation of the Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) zone, Paris
maintains a stranglehold over the economies of Francophone Africa countries. Of the
fourteen African nations in the CFA zone, as many as eight are in West Africa, and for
that matter, ECOWAS. The CFA zone which pegged the currencies of member states to
the French franc was itself an outgrowth of economic and financial arrangements by
which France managed its colonies prior to WWII. 157 The zone ensured an effective
annexation of the economies of member states, and thereby guaranteed Paris a central
position on the political and terrain as well. 158
In addition to these structural financial linkages France continues to generate
substantial aid to its African enclaves. For example, from 1990 to 1992 alone, French aid
to Africa exceeded $8.2 billion. 159 In addition to it's unilateral support, France uses its
European leverage to motivate multilateral initiatives with other European Union (EU)
members, such as the Lome Convention. These economic and political entrenchment
make France the "natural" guarantor of the political stability and legitimacy of regimes in
Francophone Africa.
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Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa, Washington: National Defense University
Press, 1989, p. xiii.
157 James M. Boughton, "The CFA Franc: Zone of Fragile Stability in Africa," IMF Finance and
Development, December, 1992, from Lexis Nexis.
158 This is part of the explanation why it is difficult if not impossible to sustain an insurgency or
coup d'etat in Francophone Africa without a prior fiat from Paris. The guarantee of regime
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By far the most important factor which drives the diversity of threat perception
among ECOWAS is the ubiquitous and forceful presence of French troops and bases
throughout Francophone Africa. France permanently stations about 10,000 troops across
Francophone Africa, with additions on standby to be deployed in the event of any
contingency. The reinforcement of troops, logistics, supplies and communications were
all guaranteed through various defense and military assistance "agreements" and
"understandings" which gave French troops every conceivable priority including 24 hour
landing rights, etc. throughout Francophone Africa. Perhaps they do even require landing
rights since French troops are ever present. 160 Through a forceful military presence,
France is able to ensure the stability of preferred regimes as well as to shore up or
undermine the legitimacy of any regime that falls out of favor with Paris. To
operationalize these military structures, the French established permanent bases across
Africa, conduct joint training, educate African military officers in France, provide
strategic and security assistance planning and resident advisors in every important sector
of government, including the presidency of every Francophone African state.
Yet another important but less obvious implication of France's economic and
military "benevolence" is that it provides French intelligence services to African leaders
and thus enables France to be privy to all levels of information of national secrets of
Francophone Africa. 161 Of course such intelligence is of great value during coups d'etat,
insurgencies, etc., and Paris sometimes manipulates sensitive intelligence issues to
facilitate compliance from African leaders.
The net effect of French military presence is the protection of French interests and
assets by assuring the longevity of particular puppet African leaders and governments.
The effect of colonial acculturation is to make the Francophone African population,
160 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989, p. 118.
There are suggestions that France is planning reductions in its foreign military presence as part
of an austerity measure force on the Chirac administration to their need to join the first tier of the
European Union single currency. While this signals hope for the independence of Francophone
Africa, it would seem the prospects of a French disengagement from Africa is at best a hope.
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especially the political elite, accept all policies that are sanctioned by the French. Thus,
regime legitimacy becomes a mere function of the demonstration of the support of France
for the regime in question. For example, Paris generally maintains so-called experts or
advisors termed counselors in every important Ministry of state including an adviser to
every President in Francophone Africa. These French counselors, wherever they are
found, are usually the supervisors often over African deputies. The attachment of French
counselors is even more common in the realm of national security, intelligence and
defense. As a general rule of the common sense of survival and career advancement, an
African official and officer should never challenge or contest a French officer or official
even when the latter is patently in error. Even more ironic is the fact that more often than
not, junior French officers and officials are posted to billets where they oversee Africans
who may be far more senior, experienced, and in some cases, better qualified. 162 In the
public service, bureaucracy as well as the military, there are few things as politically
incorrect and as professionally suicidal to contradict a French officer or counselor.
Consequently, these counselors have the prerogative in all matters and decisions.
Specifically, the maintenance of a large number of French bureaucrats and
entrepreneurs in Cote d'lvoire ensured support for Houphouet Boigny's monopoly on
political power and thereby contributed to the perceived effectiveness of the public and
private sectors of the Ivorian economy. 163 Significant for this perception is the fact that in
Cote d'lvoire French Marines were permanently based at Port Bouet. 164 There are similar
bases in Gabon, Chad, and, until recently, in Senegal. 165 In addition to these are several
other military, paramilitary, and civilian security operatives littered in every bureaucracy
that matters, especially in the gendarmerie and all security and or intelligence agencies.
The physical presence of French forces, who the average Francophone African citizen
(military and civilian) perceives as "superior," is a significant implicit warning against
162 This is confirmed by interviews with some Francophone African officers at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
163 Robert E. Handloff ed., Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study, Washington, DC, 1991, p. 29, 198.
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insubordinate political or military action that might create instability or undermine the
legitimacy of a Paris-approved regime.
3. British Commonwealth of Independent States and Regional Security
In contrast to the Francophone countries of West Africa, post-independent
Anglophone countries could not in any way count on such assistance from Britain. The
British Commonwealth of independent states was not characterized by the pandering and
cajoling that has become the norm of the Communuaete. British colonial policy was itself
markedly different from the French and does not appear to have left the same depth of
dependencies in social, political, economic, military and security structures of its former
colonies. This is not to underestimate the value of post-independence British cooperation
with members of the British Commonwealth, and the various mechanisms of cooperation
by which London maintains leverage. However, in general, post-colonial British foreign
policy towards its former colonies appears less direct and interventionist in comparison
with the intrusive, direct, active, sustained, and comprehensive neo-colonial French
policy towards the Communuate of Francophone African states.
Britain did not at any stage after independence maintain a comparable military
presence or bases in its former African colonies. British foreign policy has little known
history of the direct use of British troops in former colonies after independence. Even
though the British continue to provide military education and training assistance, 166 this is
by no measure near the scale and commitment of the French. For example, the Joint
Services Training Team (JSTT) agreed to in 1962, by which Britain consolidated its
military presence in Ghana by providing training and advisory support; with some British
officers in command positions in the Ghana Air Force and Navy was aborted in 1971.
Meanwhile, since 1958, Ghana has continued to receive military assistance from other
sources including Canada, German Democratic Republic, China, Israel, U.S., Italy,
Libya, Cuba and the Soviet Union, etc. 167 However, despite these varied influences, the




Ghanaian military appears to retain its basic British doctrine standards and military
structures.
Similarly, Nigeria terminated a short lived defense pact with Britain shortly after
independence in 1962. 168 A long standing training arrangement with Britain ended in
1986 with the "Nigerianization" of training. 169 Nigeria's political and military
assertiveness and independence from Britain is demonstrated by the fact that in addition
to severing most military cooperation with its former metropole, Lagos had one of the
most internationally diversified and balanced defense procurement strategies. 170 Nigeria is
said to perceive France as an extra continental threat because among other reasons, Paris'
"close cultural political and economic and military ties with its former colonies
perpetuated metropolitan loyalties at the expense of inter-African identity and ties." 171
Specifically, the extent to which France's pervasive economic and military ties may
inhibit regional security cooperation and the development of a regional collective security
arrangement is best illustrated by the divisions within ECOWAS over ECOMOG.
It would also seem that the post-colonial political elite of Anglophone Africa,
such as Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, and Siaka Stephens
of Sierra Leone, were more "rebellious," assertive and indeed independent of London
than their Francophone counterparts such as Presidents Sedar Leopold Senghor of
Senegal, Houphouet Boigny of Cote d'lvoire, Eyadema of Togo, etc. In fact, Houphouet
Boigny was even initially opposed to an early independence. 172
4. A Rescue?
As a result of these internal and external political factors, the West African
Community reflected conflicting economic and national security concerns. This rendered
any form of effective cooperation difficult, if not impossible. Like a house divided
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against itself, ECOWAS was in a large measure stillborn and therefore remained very
much ineffective. This situation persisted until some ECOWAS members felt threatened
by the trends in the Liberian civil war. ECOWAS became a handy forum within which
sub-regional leaders tried to assume direct responsibility for management of the conflict
in Liberia which they perceived to be a threat to their stability and the legitimacy of their
own regimes.
The extent to which ECOWAS was divided by colonial and neo-colonial political,
economic and security structures, made the prospects of achieving consensus on the
deployment of an intervention force such as ECOMOG most unlikely. The central
obstacle to sub-regional security cooperation was that the political and security postures
of ECOWAS member states varied across the Anglophone and Francophone divide. I
would even go so far as to suggest that the lack of consensus over ECOMOG was to a
large extent inevitable because even if Francophone West African states were disposed to
joining an intervention initiative, this would almost invariably be subject to "approval" of
France. This explains why despite the need for Francophone participation to balance the
Anglophone character of ECOMOG, it took a combination of factors including President
Abdou Diouf of Senegal's Chairmanship of ECOWAS and the overwhelming influence
of the U.S. to secure a Senegalese participation. 173 This is more so because it is
conventional Paris arm-twisting diplomacy for the French to decline the use of assets,
equipment, logistics, etc. that are donated by France in operations, joint training
exercises, or projects that do not receive prior Paris approval. 174 In the worse case
scenarios Paris' "gunboat diplomacy" can go so far as directly or indirectly intervening to
punish by breaking disobedient local regimes" 175
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In the case of the Liberian civil war and ECOMOG, this general lack of
independent policy-making may have been compounded by the emergence of French
business interests in the mineral rich territories that fell to the NPFL. In any case, there
was no practical need for countries such as Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso to
contemplate the squeezing out of French control since they had already bandwagoned
with the NPFL and consequently had no cause to be apprehensive about the prospects and
implications of a rebel military victory in Liberia. In the context of such differing security
structures, postures and perceptions of the threat provided the SMC a handy boat to
rescue ECOWAS. Nigeria proposed the formation of an ECOWAS SMC to be
responsible for mediating between the warring factions, imposing a cease-fire and
ultimately finding a lasting solution to the conflict on the basis of a peace plan that had
been adopted by the full compliment of the ECOWAS Authority.
This I argue was the strategic move that rescued the potential deadlock within the
community which would have erupted mainly along the persisting Francophone-
Anglophone divide. It is significant to note that even though the resort to the SMC by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), this was the first time it was used by ECOWAS.
The covert and overt role of countries such as Burkina Faso and Cote d'lvoire had
become popular knowledge throughout West Africa. Further, West African governments
know too well that any direct stalemate between Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso on the
one hand, and a line up of countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone, etc.,
would be a potentially explosive and could trigger a major regional crisis. Hence, it was
critical in devising a mechanism to address the war, to avoid jeopardizing it along
colonial rivalries and running the costly risk of failing to respond to the trends in the
Liberian war or worse still, ending up in a major regional crises. The good news for
future of Africa's regional security cooperation is that Paris in the wake of new EU
realities is battling with its addiction to Africa and may be cutting its military presence
and evolving more enlightened cooperation with Africa. 176
176




The need to evolve and build upon a sub regional security cooperation system
cannot be overemphasized. Given the end of the Cold War, the prevailing opinion among
U.S. policy makers is that the U.S. has no vital economic or security interests in Sub-
Saharan Africa and therefore should not directly intervene in its crises. Given the new
priorities of the post-Cold War era the UN, the international community and Africa's
former colonial masters are less likely to intervene in the future. Consequently, the future
of intervention in conflicts that plague the continent is going to depend more on what
Africans can offer themselves and how they can unite to deal with regional instabilities.
As such, the lessons, relevance and implications of ECOMOG for the future of
humanitarian relief, political stability and regional security in West Africa seem
invaluable.
This thesis shows that the principal actors in ECOMOG have profound
similarities in their political and security dynamics. Significantly, the security posture of
these states differs considerably from their Francophone neighbors due mainly to the
inherent dependence of the latter on France as the guarantor of security, legitimacy and
stability. The shared vulnerabilities of ECOMOG states facilitated the common
perception that the Liberia civil war was a threat to their stability and legitimacy. This
was specifically because of the precedent value of an NPFL victory, the participation of
sub-regional dissidents with the NPFL, the degeneration of the war along tribal lines, the
risks of refugees, and the hostility of Taylor which made some sub-regional leaders
perceive the Liberia conflict as one that would infest their own countries if it were not
preempted.
This analysis shows from both theoretical and practical perspectives, that
ECOMOG states (for that matter all sovereign states) in their international relations,
especially in the realm of security cooperation, tend to be guided by strategic calculations
of national self-interest. It was the convergence of these strategic concerns that enabled
some sub-regional leaders to foster such a cohesive alliance to balance against the threat.
On the other hand, it is instructive in explaining how a shared interest in the fortunes of
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the NPFL resulted in what was essentially a bandwagoning behavior by some
Francophone West African states.
A. EFFECTS, LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ECOMOG
ECOMOG has demonstrated the strengths as well as weaknesses of sub-regional
security cooperation especially in the context of active conflict or war. As a test case of
West African peacekeeping or enforcement and the first of its kind by a sub-regional
organization, it has generated many effects lessons and implications.
Importantly, this research explains the strategic mindset of West Africa leaders, in
the context of the post Cold War security challenges that are likely to plague Africa and
other parts of the world in the foreseeable future. Consequently, these insights may
facilitate the understanding of security cooperation in Africa and elsewhere.
ECOMOG raises the important question of how in an instability-prone region
such as West Africa could ECOWAS contemplate the effective promotion of economic
integration without reference to a regional security framework. The dominance of
security issues and concerns for regional stability make it imperative that economic
relations be harnessed on a sound political and security foundation. Otherwise, without
stability, the objectives of economic integration are difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish. ECOMOG also illustrates the awareness of the inextricable link between
economic objectives and regional security.
But even more importantly, ECOMOG has brought to the fore some of the
structural and procedural obstacles that underlie West African power politics. An
understanding of such constraints will influence policy attempts at evolving promoting
cooperation in Africa, vacuum that resulted from the major shifts in global economic,
political and security, order.
As ECOMOG clearly brings to the fore, cooperation across the Anglophone-
Francophone divide is a major obstacle. However, if French withdrawal materializes,
West African states may be better disposed to arriving at a threat consensus as the basic
prerequisite for effective sub-regional security cooperation.
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From a theoretical significance, ECOMOG elicits that the lack of a shared
vulnerability to the perceived threat puts different member states at cross purposes, thus
preventing the convergence of security needs and an alliance cohesion. As such, the
future of a sustained and supported sub-regional coalition will depend on the how much
longer Paris will continue to turn its back on its African proxies.
This leads to the necessity to re-examine the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-
Aggression. Clearly, Community states were focused on preempting covert and overt acts
of aggression among themselves, while perpetuating the principle of non-intervention.
Similarly, the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense needs to be made
relevant. This protocol in principle reflects some conscious attempts to deal with some of
the major lapses and impediments to the prospects of evolving some type of sub-regional
collective security regime such as ECOMOG. These protocols raise a myriad of issues
and their relevance and utility in their present form is put in issue by ECOMOG.
The promoters of ECOMOG chose the option that held a promise of political
correctness, moral justification and ready legitimacy as practically feasible. Determined
to circumvent all impediments, West African leaders masked their real, strategic and
legitimate motives with rhetoric. Arguably, to the extent that ECOMOG has fostered
some regional cooperation, it has also heightened mutual suspicion among regional
leaders and probably made difficult the prospects of initiating future cooperation.
Significantly, the lessons of diplomacy, compromise, negotiation, and even
national interests seem opposed, a fact that could not be escaped. West African leaders,
especially Nigeria, may have learned crucial lessons of negotiation and dialogue.
From an operational point of view, ECOMOG showed that although peace
enforcement operations may create conditions for negotiations and a cease-fire, they tend
to be costly in terms of in human resources and logistics. The casualties that result from
enforcement operations tends to generate international disapproval, unfavorable press and
adverse public opinion and consequently undermines support and legitimacy. The lessons
on the necessity of pursuing a broad consensus could not be better learned, although
Nigeria's subsequent rush into the Sierra Leonean crises does not reflect this learning.
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The cautious approach of Ghana, Guinea and other members of ECOMOG however is
instructive.
To a certain extent, ECOWAS failed to exploit fully its first opportunity to
evolve and lay out the rules of a security cooperation framework. In addition,
ECOMOG' s modest attempt suffered severe setbacks and considerable criticism largely
because of sub-regional leaders to pretenses and propaganda.
ECOMOG also shows that while "soft" or "neutral" intervention may be possible,
there are as a reality no neutral state actors. States
,
big or small, weak or powerful, are all
motivated by national interests in their international relations and policy. This golden rule
of state behavior admits of lesser exceptions, particularly in the realm of national
security. However, rhetoric seems to be a conventional spice in the international relations
recipe. Consequently, leaders, politicians and policy makers ought to possess the insight
to see beyond rhetoric and political correctness, the real motivations of state actors. The
importance of such an insight to the fashioning of appropriate policy responses and the
pursuit of desired goals and interests cannot be over emphasized.
From a political perspective, it is significant that ECOMOG was a catalyst for the
subsequent adoption in 1991 of the ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles at the
Abuja Summit, in Nigeria. This declaration pledged to the observance of democratic
principles and respect for fundamental human rights. This joint resolve appeared to
accelerate the processes of political and economic reform that had already begun in
countries such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and even Nigeria.
Because of this and other reasons, Liberia, and the onerous burden of sustaining
ECOMOG, may have taught regional dictators that whatever the constraints, it is in their
own interests to pursue accountable and democratic government. However, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone have already suffered severe setbacks to their troubled transitions. Nigeria's
anxiety in to restore democracy to Sierra Leone illustrates this awareness despite its
inability to accelerate change in their own country.
Significantly, ECOMOG was the first peacekeeping effort of that scale that was
not conducted by the UN. It was also the first in which the UN cooperated with a sub-
regional organization in a major peacekeeping and enforcement operation as a secondary
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actor. These circumstances, coupled with the approval and support of the UN as well as
the OAU of the ECOWAS Peace Plan, may have given ECOMOG and its principals
an improved profile, leverage, legitimacy and visibility in the international community.
The experience of troop contributing countries funding their own participation
without any financial or other support from the ECOWAS Secretariat brought into focus
the need to contribute to ensure the financial viability of ECOWAS in other ensure its
capability to deal with future contingencies.
Specifically, ECOMOG provides a rudimentary framework for the evolution of a
conflict resolution mechanism. This seems most timely and appropriate, given the
recommendations of the U. S. government and its allies for the formation of an African
Crises Response Force. Admittedly, ECOMOG suffered severe constraints, but it may be
argued that in reality it is as best as West Africans may get under the circumstances.
Moreover, ECOMOG has been the only event that has attempted to wrestle some of the
structural legacies of Africa politics and security cooperation.
The dark side of ECOMOG is that it has many implications for regional security
and stability, but even more importantly, for the future of democracy, human rights and
the rule of Law. If West Africa's teething democracies should stall, a mechanism such as
ECOMOG could become a means by which corrupt, illegitimate and unaccountable
dictatorships may collaborate across national boundaries and mutually assist each other to
consolidate and perpetuate their wield on power. In particular, the intransigence of
Nigeria's corrupt military oligarchy against embarking on the inevitable transition to
civilian rule raises questions about Nigeria's designs in ECOMOG.
However, if democracy were to prevail beyond the mere formalism of elections,
etc. within the West Africa sub region, then ECOMOG may provide the much needed
security cooperation framework for responding to regional instabilities which are likely to
occur.
Significantly, ECOMOG projected into the political debate both in Africa and in
the international community, the relic of colonial Anglophone - Francophone rivalries. In
my view, this is likely to remain a major obstacle that will challenge the strategic insight
of West African policymakers in all spheres of regional cooperation and, in particular,
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security cooperation. Even in the unlikely event of a French pullout, the security vacuum
that would result may warrant security cooperation mechanisms such as ECOMOG.
Even though it provided a real life theater and opportunity for a practice and
testing of equipment and human resource capabilities, ECOMOG has revealed its lack of
training, logistics, planning
,
professionalism, etc. It has revealed the specific needs of
West African forces. Inadequacies in communications, transportation, logistics and other
equipment all came to the fore; subsequent military assets may be better applied.
It is necessary in the furtherance of global security, that the international
community assist West Africans to accomplish appropriate levels of training, logistics
and supplies necessary to execute humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and enforcement
operations and other military operations other than war. This will reduce if not eliminate
the frequency of the direct deployment of Western or U.S. forces in Africa even under
austerity. Enhanced training and capabilities will likely improve military professionalism
and influence civil-military relations.
Military assistance offers contingency response capabilities and "first aid."
However, the sustained solution to the Africa's conflicts may be rooted in addressing the
deficit of democracy on the continent. The dispatch with which most West African
leaders initiated democratic reforms following Liberia's crises is indicative of the
realization that democracy can be a conflict-mitigating factor. International opinion
should consequently not relent in assisting critical community members such as Nigeria
in moving towards reform.
ECOMOG is a clear indication that given a relatively permissive international
environment, Africans in general and West Africans in particular, can manage their own
affairs. Although the financial, economic and other costs of maintaining substantial levels
of troops, logistics, communications, etc., will continue to hurt West African economies,
ECOMOG is crucial to the pursuit of stability in Africa. Ultimately, it provides an
imperfect model for the development of a Wets African crises response capability which
is a prerequisite for statehood and regional self-sufficiency.
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